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     In recent years, many governments in developing countries have – in 
various ways and to varying degrees – democratised their political systems.  
But as they have done so, it has become clear that democracy does not 
automatically benefit poor people and groups that have long faced social 
exclusion.   
 
     This realisation is bound up with the recognition that there is more to 
poverty than just low incomes and a scarcity of material assets.  Poor people – 
both the poorest
1 and large numbers of decidedly poor people who are not quite 
so destitute – not only suffer from the problems that are captured in the Human 
Development Index (illiteracy, malnutrition, disease, etc).  They are also 
afflicted by socio-political disadvantages that impede their ability to share in 
the benefits of democratisation.   
 
     The least well off tend strongly to be: 
  the least confident,  
  the least well organised, 
  the least capable of articulating their concerns, 
  the least knowledgeable about the political and policy processes, 
  the least able to gain access to those two processes, to benefits that 
flow from them, and to public services and legal protection, 
  the least skilled at exerting influence over those two processes, 
  the least well connected (with one another and with influential 
people), and 
  the least independent of larger economic forces. 
 
Their needs are great, but need by itself does not imply the awareness and the 
ability to take collective action in increasingly democratised systems.
2  
 
     The growing understanding of these realities has persuaded many in 
developing countries that, if the poor are to make the gains which are necessary 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, steps must be taken to address 
these problems.  Democratisation alone is insufficient.  Poor people must be 
more fully included in newly democratised systems.  Just as an earlier 
generation recognised the need for growth with redistribution, many today have 
come to see the need for democratisation with inclusion.  
  
     With this in mind, many governments in developing countries have recently 
undertaken political reforms -- new policies, institutions and strategies that are 
intended to promote the empowerment and inclusion of ordinary people, 
especially the poor, and their capacity to take collective action.  This chapter 
                                                             
1   See for example, M. Lipton, The Poor and the Poorest: Some Interim Findings, World Bank 
Discussion Paper 25 (Washington, 1988); and J. Sachs’ contribution to Annual World Bank Conference 
on Development Economics – 2000: Proceedings, on the World Bank website. 
2   V.S.P. Coelho, I.A.L. De Andrade and M.C. Montoya, “Deliberative Fora and the Democratisation 
of Social Policies in Brazil”, IDS Bulletin (April 2002) p, 71.   3
examines these by focusing mainly at and just above the local level, since it is 
there that the impact of these new initiatives must be felt.   
 
     It has to be said that some governments in developing countries are (so far 
at least) disinclined to attempt such reforms.  Some have initiated reforms that 
impinge at the local level as substitutes for reforms higher up.  Some have 
hesitated to pursue reforms very far.  By assessing the promise of various 
reforms, this chapter seeks to encourage greater efforts in this vein.     
 
     Political reforms can yield significant benefits not just for poor and 
excluded groups, but also for the governments that undertake them.  Reforms 
which have real substance and which enable significant bottom-up input from 
poor and excluded groups, can enhance efforts to address many of the problems 
identified in other chapters of this report.  That is clearly in the interests of 
governments in developing nations that have committed themselves to the 
Millennium Development Goals.  And – not incidentally from political leaders’ 
point of view – these reforms tend strongly to increase the legitimacy and the 
popularity of the governments that introduce them. 
 
     There is no shortage of studies that focus on, or assume the likelihood of 
state failure.  By contrast, this chapter concentrates on state potential and the 
potential of political reforms.  This can be done in a spirit of hard-headed 
realism.  There is plenty of empirical evidence to indicate not just the 
limitations of governments – on which so many analyses have dwelt -- but also 
the promise of political reforms.  The presumption of state failure is as 
unrealistic as starry-eyed optimism.  This analysis seeks to avoid both 
extremes.      
 
     This chapter consists of three parts.  Part I identifies the range of political 
reforms that have gained momentum in recent years.  Part II examines how 
these have worked in practice, and the conditions that tend to enhance (or 
undermine) their constructive potential.  Part III focuses on actions that might 
strengthen that potential – on issues that need to be addressed and on 
supportive initiatives, conditions and coalitions that could make a difference. 
 
     Much of this analysis applies to countries that are falling short in the pursuit 
of the Millennium Development Goals.  But it is also relevant to countries that 
are largely on track to achieve those goals, since large numbers of people in 
many of those countries do not fully enjoy the benefits which flow from that 
achievement.  The initiatives assessed here can help in both cases.   4
 
PART I:  POTENTIALLY CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVES 
 
     These initiatives fall into five broad categories.  
 
  The devolution of powers and resources onto elected, multi-purpose 
local councils, which have been created or strengthened in over 60 
developing countries. 
  The creation of ‘user committees’ in connection with development 
programmes in single sectors. 
  The introduction of other processes and devices to promote bottom-
up participation, consultation, downward accountability and 
empowerment.   
  Government efforts to engage with, and to enlist support from, 
sections of civil society.  
  The encouragement of competition among elites who need political 
support from poor, excluded groups. 
 
     None of these sets of initiatives is a panacea.  None is free of ambiguities.  
But they hold genuine promise of headway towards the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals and towards greater influence, autonomy, 
liberty and dignity for ordinary people – and not least for disadvantaged groups 
-- in developing countries.  We need to consider each of them in a little more 
detail.   
 
Devolution to Elected Multi-Purpose Councils  
 
     Since the early 1980s, many governments (of widely varying character) 
have created elected councils or revived moribund councils at and above the 
local level.  These councils are assigned multiple tasks – often local schools, 
health centres, minor roads, minor public works, natural resource management, 
etc.  The stated purpose of these initiatives has been to draw ordinary people – 
through their elected representatives – into decisions about development 
policies and projects.    
 
     Most of the early initiatives in this vein were taken by governments in 
developing countries on their own – without encouragement from international 
donor agencies.  Donors later began to press for decentralisation, but even 
when they did so, the demonstration effect from successful experiments in 
other developing countries was often the main trigger for action by 
governments.   
 
     Almost all decisions to experiment with democratic decentralisation have 
been taken by senior government figures in the absence of pressure from below 
for devolution.
3  But to say this is not to suggest that these reforms are 
                                                             
3   The only exceptions are South Korea and, arguably, the Philippines.   5
somehow invalid.  Where decentralised systems have worked tolerably well, 
these supply-driven initiatives have catalysed substantial demand from below 
for influence over decisions that affect the well being of ordinary folk.  Such 
systems tend to take on a life of their own and sometimes make it impossible 
for governments to continue using them as substitutes for political reform at 
higher levels – as Box 1 illustrates. 
 
 
Box 1: Political Reforms Can Take on a Life of Their Own and Help to  
            Trigger Broader Reforms  
 
     In Bangladesh in 1985, the military dictatorship of General H.M Ershad 
created new councils at the sub-district level to serve as a substitute for genuine 
democracy at the national level.  Free and fair elections selected chairpersons 
for these councils, while council members were indirectly elected by local-
level councils that had long existed.  General Ershad channelled substantial 
development funds to the new chairpersons and, thereby, turned them into 
valuable allies at a level in the political system where he had previously lacked 
backers.  For a time, this decentralised system seemed a tame bulwark of the 
military regime. 
 
     This emboldened the government to go to excess at the elections to village-
level councils in 1988.  It used violence very widely to intimidate opposition 
parties.  In many areas this frightened many voters away from the polls, and in 
others the security forces barred voters’ way.  In most parts of the country, few 
(or no) people voted – but this did not stop the government from declaring 
candidates sympathetic to it as victors.  This violent episode became know as 
“the voter less election”.           
 
     In reaction to this, and to the subservience to the regime of sub-district 
council chairpersons, voters at a freer sub-district council election in March 
1990 ousted over 90% of incumbent chairpersons.  This was a clear signal that 
they preferred genuinely autonomous councils, and more generally, that they 
were fed up with military rule.  That election added fuel to a mounting 
campaign of mass protest for the restoration of democracy – which in 
November 1990, toppled the dictatorship.  This decentralised system, which 
began as a substitute for national-level democracy, eventually became a key 
element in its restoration. 
 
 
     Where governments have been generous in devolving powers and resources, 
these institutions have often managed impressive achievements.  The political 
and policy processes become more transparent, accountable and effective.  
Government becomes more responsive – in three senses.  The speed of 
responses from government institutions increases because local authorities need 
no longer wait (often for long periods) for permission from higher levels before   6
acting.  The quantity of responses increases because local councils almost 
always prefer to spend money on numerous small projects, rather than on a few 
big, expensive things -- hospitals, dams, etc. – which are often favoured by 
those higher up.  And crucially, the quality of responses improves – if ‘quality’ 
is measured by the degree to which responses conform to popular preferences.    
 
     The overall amount of money corruptly diverted from development 
programmes has sometimes declined – because decentralisation enhances 
transparency.  Absenteeism by government employees in local schools and 
health centres has sometimes declined, as Box 2 illustrates.  Information flows 
between governments and ordinary people improves markedly – in both 
directions.  Bureaucrats are empowered by an increase in the flow of 
information from below, through elected members of local councils.  They 
receive early warnings of potential disasters in remote localities – outbreaks of 
disease, floods, droughts, etc. – and empowered local authorities are able to 
react swiftly, before things mushroom into catastrophes.  The uptake on 
government health programmes increases because elected local councillors are 
better able than bureaucrats to explain the rationale for them in terms that 
ordinary folk can grasp.  These gains enhance the job satisfaction of lower-
level bureaucrats, and compensate somewhat for the loss of some of their 
former powers.  Decentralising governments gain greater legitimacy and 
popularity in the eyes of local dwellers.  And because ordinary people gain a 
voice in decisions about development projects, they acquire a sense of 
ownership of them, so that projects (and development) become more 
sustainable.
4          
 
 
Box 2: Reducing Absenteeism among Government Employees in Health and 
Education    
 
     In South Asia, absenteeism by government employees in schools and local 
health centres is a severe problem.  By some estimates, these people go missing 
more than 70% of the time.  In certain Indian states where decentralised 
councils have been substantially empowered, absenteeism has been 
significantly (though not spectacularly) reduced.  Members and chairperson of 
the councils have the power to reprimand, suspend -- and in certain places, 
even to dismiss – errant employees.  And when ordinary people learn of these 
powers – which council members delight in announcing – they routinely bring 
complaints about absenteeism to councillors.  Prompt action tends to follow.  
The reduction in absenteeism thus enhances the delivery of basic health and 
education services at no extra cost to the exchequer.  This can have a palpable 
impact in the pursuit of Millennium Development Goals 2 (achieving universal 
primary education), 4 (reducing child mortality), 5 (improving maternal health) 
and 6 (combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases).   7
      In a large number of cases, however, elected local councils have found it 
difficult to make great headway because governments have been unwilling to 
devolve substantial powers and resources to them.  Some of these systems have 
stagnated.  Many have performed tolerably well, though not spectacularly.  
Even those that work only tolerably well usually stimulate greater participation, 
civil society activity, and information flows between governments and society.  
They tend to make government at least somewhat more transparent, 
accountable and responsive.  This often reduces popular apathy, alienation and 
cynicism.   
 
     But – as we shall see in more detail in Part II -- they do not automatically or 
consistently benefit poor and socially excluded groups.  This problem needs to 
be tackled since, if they can be made more inclusive, they have even greater 
promise. 
 
Creating Single-Purpose ‘User Committees’ 
 
     Since the early 1990s, many governments in developing countries have 
created ‘user committees’ (sometimes called ‘stakeholder committees’).  Their 
stated purpose is to encourage consultation with ordinary folk at the local level 
about development policies within single sectors – health committees, parent 
teacher associations, water users’ committees, joint forest management 
committees, etc.  The proliferation of user committees has been vast and rapid.  
In just one sector in just one Indian state, there are no fewer than 10,000 user 
committees.
5  When we multiply that across other sectors and all developing 
countries, the number of such committees is staggering.   
 
     User committees are both extremely important and little studied, partly 
because they are relatively new.  So the comments on them here are more 
tentative than the remarks made about other initiatives.  But despite this – and 
despite serious doubts about how often they qualify as political reforms that 
empower ordinary people (discussed in Part II), the rapid spread of these 
bodies compels us to consider them.   
 
     They differ from multi-purpose local councils in several important ways -- 
four of which are worth stressing.   
 
  Their origins are different – they are mostly inspired by donor 
programs, which sometimes means that governments in 
developing countries have a rather tenuous sense of ownership of 
them and are inclined to manipulate them in ways that donors do 
not intend. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
4   R.C. Crook and J. Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa: 
Participation, Accountability and Performance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998). 
5   This refers to committees for the welfare of women and children in the state of Andhra Pradesh.   8
  Their remits are different – they deal with single developmental 
sectors, in contrast to local councils with multiple 
responsibilities. 
  The funding provided to them (often from donors) is usually 
more (often far more) generous than that provided to local 
councils. 
  The processes by which their members are selected are often less 
reliably democratic than the secret ballot elections that are 
normally used to choose members of local councils. 
 
     Because their members are often selected by less fully democratic means 
than are local councillors, and because some governments are even more 
inclined than with local councils to seek to coopt and control them, user 
committees usually do less than local councils to promote participation, 
transparency, accountability, responsiveness, etc.  And like councils, they often 
fail to serve the needs of poorer groups – not least because governments 
sometimes draw prosperous people onto user committees.  But they are not 
without promise, and their often abundant funding gives them substantial 
potential – if governments manage them in ways that can benefit the poor. 
 
Other Devices to Promote Bottom-Up Participation and Empowerment 
 
     Governments in many developing countries have also experimented with 
other devices and processes to promote more bottom-up participation, 
downward accountability to ordinary people – especially the poor -- and greater 
responsiveness from state actors.  Some of these have been linked to councils 
and user committees, while others stand apart from them.   
 
     These initiatives include the following. 
 
1.  Mass local-level meetings to deliberate on development issues    
2.  Direct democracy at the local level 
3.  Incorporating pro-poor civil society organisations into decentralised    
                 systems 
4.   Instruments to permit action to secure citizens’ rights 
5.   Devices to improve access to information and services 
6.   Exercises in participatory auditing 
7.   Initiatives to change the ethos and behaviour of government   
       employees 
8.    Incentives and sanctions for government employees 
9.    Exercises in participatory planning 
10.  Joint management with civil society organisations of development  
       programmes 
 
   9
The workings of these devices are examined in Part II. 
 
Enlisting Support from Sections of Civil Society 
 
     If political leaders’ efforts at reform are to be politically sustainable, they 
need backing from important interest groups at all levels in the political system.  
And if reforms are to make an impact on disadvantaged groups at the local 
level (and thus on the Millennium Development Goals), they need help from 
those groups themselves and from organisations that support them.     
 
     Some organisations within civil society -- both at local and at higher levels -
- will either oppose political reforms or seek to prevent the poor and socially 
excluded from benefiting from them.  Civil society, like democratic 
decentralisation, sometimes tends to reproduce and not to challenge existing 
hierarchies, inequalities and patterns of exclusion.  So governments need to 




     Many political leaders actively seek to enlist support from sympathetic 
sections of civil society.  But some are reluctant to engage with civic 
associations – often because they regard them as alien, truculent, illegitimate or 
weak.  In many developing countries, civil society is indeed rather weak -- and 
that is often especially true of organisations consisting of or supporting the 
poor.  It is thus a matter of urgency that governments – which do far more to 
shape civil society than the social science literature suggests – develop 
sympathetic views of civic associations – especially pro-poor organisations -- 
and do their best to encourage them.   
 
     If pro-poor reforms are to be politically sustainable, ‘allies’ of the poor are 
critically important.  It is almost always necessary to cultivate support from 
broad social coalitions that include both poorer groups and some elements of 
the non-poor.  Coalitions of this kind seldom develop without some 
encouragement by powerful actors in governments.  So leaders who are serious 
about progress towards the Millennium Development Goals need to pay 
attention to the creation -- and, over time, the maintenance -- of such coalitions.  
Political reforms are usually very attractive to non-poor groups.  But to ensure 
that some of those groups join forces with poorer groups to support efforts to 
ensure that the poor also benefit, governments need to 
 
                                                             
6   It is important, for analytical reasons, that we not define ‘uncivil’ organisations out of civil society – 
as some do.  The term ‘civil society’ applies to all voluntary associations with significant autonomy 
from the state – including those representing prosperous groups that may oppose gains for the poor, and 
those that might favour autocracy, hierarchy and social exclusion.  The civil society initiatives 
discussed in this chapter tend, of course, to emerge from organisations that are more enlightened.  Also 
note that ‘civil society’ includes not just large NGOs, but also smaller, more informal organisations at 
lower levels.   10
  bring organisations representing the poor and the non-poor together, 
around issues of mutual concern and interest, and  
  include elements in new initiatives that appeal to some non-poor 




     When governments adopt this approach, and encourage the pursuit of goals 
which are shared by diverse interests, unexpectedly constructive results 
sometimes emerge – partnerships involving government institutions, civil 




Box 3:  A Partnership between Decentralised Councils, Civil Society 
            Organisations and the Private Sector 
 
     Projects to provide basic infrastructure like roads to extractive industries 
often provoke bitter resentment and conflict with residents of the localities 
affected.  But the sensitive construction of partnerships between companies, 
elected local councils, civil society organisations and ordinary people can 
sometimes overcome these problems – to everyone’s benefit.   
 
     In the Indian state of West Bengal, a coal mining company needed to 
construct a road linking one of its mines to a railway siding.  To achieve this, it 
had to gain permission to construct the road across numerous plots of land 
owned by local residents.  Local civil society organisations and the elected 
council for the area saw that the road would make the mine financially viable – 
which would ensure long-term employment in the mine for poorer local 
residents. It would also give everyone living in the locality access to a nearby 
hospital and school, and to markets for their handicrafts and other produce.  
Negotiations among these diverse interests – which entailed the use of 
participatory devices -- yielded an agreement in a much sorter time than usual.  
Permission from landowners for the building of the road in exchange for 
compensation from the company was granted, and local councils agreed to 
assume the costs of road maintenance after four years.  The involvement of 
civil society organisations (in a state which had previously been reluctant to 
interact with them) and participatory devices ensured that local residents 
understood that this was not a zero sum game and thus did not regard the 
project with resentment. 
 
     This yielded not just economic benefits but other, important but intangible 
gains for all of the three sectors (voluntary, governmental and industrial) 
involved.  Civic associations saw the benefits of engagement with the other two 
sectors.  Government institutions, which had previously been reluctant to deal 
with civil society, changed their view.  And the mining company recognised   11
that negotiations with the other sectors minimised delays and yielded a 
dependable consensus that secured its interests.  Actors in all three sectors 





     In reaching out to non-poor organisations that are avowedly pro-poor, 
governments need to be aware of one key problem.  In many developing 
countries, large national or regional non-governmental organisations that are 
pro-poor often claim  
 
  to have effective networks that penetrate down into local arenas, and  
  to be using those networks to integrate civic associations consisting 
of or supporting the poor in otherwise isolated localities, and to build 
their capacity to reap benefits from political reforms.   
 
But there is considerable evidence to indicate that those large organisations 
actually achieve this in only a few cases – examples include Brazil, the 
Philippines, India and Bangladesh.
8  Governments that pursue pro-poor 
political reforms need to encourage and assist such large organisations to 
become more effective at reaching and integrating poor and pro-poor 
organisations at the local level, since their reforms are more likely to yield 
positive results where this is true.            
 
     Pro-poor civil society organisations can of course be relied upon to mount 
initiatives of their own, quite apart from efforts by governments to enlist their 
support.  Some of these are entirely the creations of local-level voluntary 
associations.  More often, they result from collaborations between local 
associations and larger, higher-level non-governmental organisations and/or 
donor agencies.  Whatever their origin, such initiatives need to be tolerated 
and, if possible, assisted by reforming governments.  In some instances, the 
best way to assist them is by lending active support.  But in others, it is 
advisable to leave them alone – while removing impediments, especially those 
erected by low-level bureaucrats who are often more hostile to civil society 
than are their superiors.  This and other issues are discussed further in Part II.      
 
Encouraging Elite Competition for the Support of Poor and Excluded Groups 
 
     This last potential initiative is less widely recognised by political leaders in 
developing countries than those discussed above.  If however, they wish to base 
their future political prospects on popularity among the poor whose numerical 
                                                             
7   Natural Resources Cluster, Business Partners for Development, Case Study 6: Sarshatali Coal Mine, 
India – Update (London, 2002). 
8   This is based on interviews during 2002 with numerous World Bank civil society specialists and 
programme officers of the Ford Foundation who work to strengthen civil society.   12
strength in many newly democratised systems offers a solid foundation, it is 
very important – both for politicians and for the poor. 
 
     Evidence from a number of developing countries indicates that poor and 
excluded groups at the grassroots are far more able to reap political gains from 
the institutions and processes discussed above if elites at and/or just above the 
local level feel compelled to compete for their support.  Indeed, this often 
appears to have a greater impact than (i) reservations of seats on local bodies 
for members of poor or excluded groups, and perhaps even (ii) the efforts of 
pro-poor civil society organisations (especially in countries where civil society 
is weak).  If a local leader (or elite) concludes that it is in his vital interests to 
cultivate poorer groups, he (such leaders are almost always men) may not just 
appeal to them and offer them benefits, he may also work to organise and 
mobilise them.  Rival leaders and elites quickly perceive what is happening and 
often follow suit.  Competition ensues.  
 
    Such competition can take four different forms, which may coexist.  If inter-
party competition is a factor in local politics, competition may develop between 
parties.  Even if one party predominates within a local arena, different factions 
within it may compete in this way.  Where parties matter little, rival local elites 
may engage in competition.  And sometimes, individual local leaders may vie 
for the backing of the poor.  In many localities in developing countries, poor 
people are so numerous that – once democratisation begins -- it is only a matter 
of time before such competition develops.  Part II provides a discussion of how 
leaders at higher levels in political systems may encourage this sort of 
contestation.  It is often difficult to do much in this vein, but contestation often 
breaks out even if they do nothing.              13
 
PART II:   HOW INITIATIVES WORK -- AND CONDITIONS THAT  
                    ENHANCE THEIR CONSTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL 
 
     Before we turn to detailed discussions of the specific issues identified in 
Part I, it is important to call attention to three over-arching themes that affect 
all aspects of government in developing countries, and events at all levels – 
including of course the grassroots.  These themes powerfully influence how the 
initiatives examined here emerge and evolve.  And they give rise to many of 
the conditions or contextual features that inhibit or facilitate the pursuit of the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
 
This is an Era of Centrist Governments 
 
     Since the early 1990s, centrist governments have predominated – in and 
beyond the developing nations.  If this chapter were about governments that 
tried to do something for the poor in the 1970s or early 1980s, we would find 
three different types of regimes and leaders present in significant numbers  – 
radicals, populists, and reforming centrists.
9   
 
     Today, things are different.  We find only a tiny number of radical 
governments – Cuba is a rare example -- which are mainly survivals from that 
earlier era.  A few populists have emerged in recent years – Chavez in 
Venezuela, Estrada in the Philippines, N.T. Rama Rao in the Indian state of 
Andhra Pradesh.  But they are scarce, and have little staying power – the last 
two of those leaders were overthrown, and Chavez was nearly ousted and may 
yet be.   
 
     If we look at what governments do rather than what they say, we find that 
the great majority of them have felt compelled, mainly by the international 
economic order, to operate as centrists.  Even governments that we might have 
expected to be radical or leftist – in China, Vietnam, South Africa and the 
Indian state of West Bengal – have in practice situated themselves in the centre 
or the centre-left.  The same can be expected of the new government in 
Brazil.
10              
 
     Centrist predominance has ambiguous implications for the kinds of 
initiatives and policies that concern us here, and for the achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals.  Centrists tend to pursue change cautiously 
and incrementally.  In some cases, this means that the pursuit of political 
reform may be slower and less dramatic than some observers might wish.  
Nearly all of the reforms examined in this chapter entail incremental changes.  
                                                             
9   William Ascher found precisely this in his important book Scheming for the Poor: The Politics of 
Redistribution in Latin America (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1984). 
10   To say all of this is not, of course, to argue that centrist predominance is here to stay.  It may well 
turn out to be a passing phase – but for the present, it is a reality that looms large.   14
On the other hand, many of these reforms have clear promise.  And – taken 
together – they add up to a new approach to development, a new paradigm that 
offers poor and excluded groups more than the narrowly economistic, neo-
liberal perspective that dominated the 1980s. 
 
     It is also encouraging that in earlier periods, centrists with a reformist bent 
tended to succeed more often than populists (who were too capricious, self-
absorbed and disorganised) and even radicals (whose vehement words and 
actions usually provoked disastrous rightist reactions).  In particular, centrist 
reformers are especially good at constructing and maintaining pro-poor 
coalitions that contain large numbers of the non-poor – which are almost 
always essential to success.
11  So centrist predominance should not necessarily 
make us despair of achieving the Millennium Development Goals.        
 
This is an Era of Severe Fiscal Constraints 
 
    One of the main reasons governments tend to be centrist is that they nearly 
all face tight fiscal constraints.  They are also hamstrung by the loss of much of 
their former influence over key economic levers.  One analyst has argued that 
these problems have become so excruciating that governments in developing 
countries must now choose between (on the one hand) maintaining fiscal 
discipline in order to meet debt repayments and to attract foreign investment, 
and (on the other) attending to the material well-being of their citizens.
12 
 
     This is an exaggeration, but there is no doubt that it is extremely difficult for 
governments to do both of these things at the same time.  Fiscal constraints – 
and the need to proceed incrementally – create a painful dilemma for political 
leaders.  They risk becoming boring – something that politicians loathe, not 
least because it may lead to their political undoing.  They long to do something 
exciting, even heroic – for the sake of their own self esteem, and because it is 
good politics.  But most exciting things cost money, usually a great deal of 
money.   
    
     This is not at all irrelevant to the initiatives that we are considering.  The 
political reforms examined here tend not to cost substantial amounts of money.  
They mainly require changes in political and administrative behaviour and 
processes, and (in response) greater assertiveness from ordinary people and 
disadvantaged groups.  And yet, despite their incremental nature, the politicians 
undertaking them often regard them as ways to make the business of 
government and leaders themselves appear exciting and maybe even a little 
heroic to ordinary folk at the grassroots.  The evidence on such initiatives 
indicates that, when they work reasonably well, they can generate appreciation 
and sometimes even some excitement in the popular mind.  To say this is not to 
                                                             
11   Ascher, Scheming for the Poor…, p. 311. 
12   G. Hawthorn, “The Promise of ‘Civil Society’ in the South” in S. Kaviraj and S. Khilnani (eds.) 
Civil Society: History and Possibilities (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001), p. 281.   15
suggest that significant investments of public and donor funds need not and 
should not be made in these initiatives.  Substantial spending on them is 
thoroughly justified, where required and where fiscally possible.  But these 
initiatives do not threaten to bankrupt governments in straitened circumstances. 
 
Resistance to Political Reforms  
 
     Reforms always encounter political resistance.  This is the last over-arching 
theme.  Some of that resistance comes from outside government, from 
prosperous or hierarchically-minded elements in society.  To counter this, 
governments often seek to do two things that are examined later here in Part II 
– to attract support for political reforms from pro-poor groups within civil 
society, and to encourage competition among elites for the support of poorer 
groups.  But much of the resistance to reforms comes from within government. 
 
     Some senior politicians are reluctant to part with powers that need to be 
devolved to lower levels.  And even when they are inclined to yield powers, 
less exalted politicians on whom they may depend – typically legislators -- 
often resist because they fear that this will dilute their influence.  We see this in 
virtually every country, even in industrialised democracies.   
 
     Bureaucrats at lower levels also tend to oppose such measures.  They often 
seek to sabotage them by quietly refusing to comply.  Some do so because 
reforms curtail their authority and, they believe, their status and job 
satisfaction.  Others resist because reforms threaten their capacity to wield 
power arbitrarily and, thereby, to extract rents.  Since prosperous interests are 
better able to offer bribes, the arbitrary use of power tends strongly to reinforce 
existing hierarchies and injustices.   
 
     When such abuses occur at higher levels in political systems, they can be 
checked by separating powers between executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of governments.  At the local level, our main concern here, such 
elaborate institutional arrangements are (usually rightly) deemed to be 
unworkable.  Other steps need to be taken there.  
 
     Arbitrary acts at and near the local level – from which ordinary people 
suffer greatly, and the poor suffer most – of course occur in systems that have 
not been democratised.  But they are also common in systems that have 
undergone democratisation, by way of elected local councils or some other 
method.  They take three forms.     
 
  A local leader (often but not always elected), or an elite coterie 
around a leader, may capture and abuse power.  
  Low-level bureaucrats may retain much or all of the dominance that 
they have traditionally exercised, arbitrarily.   16
  Collusion between leaders (elected or otherwise) and low-level 
bureaucrats may enable them – jointly -- to act arbitrarily. 
 
     Leaders at higher levels can tackle resistance in two main ways (as we shall 
see in greater detail in Part III) -- sticks and carrots.  They need to be prepared 
to put pressure on political subordinates and bureaucrats who offer resistance.  
But the kinds of political reforms assessed here do not represent a zero sum 
game.  Government actors usually have to part with some powers, but they also 
reap compensating benefits.  This is true both of politicians and of bureaucrats 
at lower levels. 
 
     Politicians – again, typically legislators – often worry because elected 
councillors at lower levels, or people who gain influence through participatory 
devices, may erode their political dominance within their constituencies.  
Indeed, this often happens.  But anxious politicians can also take heart from the 
opportunities that these reforms offer them to develop stronger, more 
dependable networks of support – if they are willing to turn these newly 
influential people into allies.   
 
     If they reach out to them with offers to help address their needs and to 
intercede on their behalf with higher authority, they can establish transactional 
ties to these people.  This can be very helpful since a legislator’s constituency 
usually contains many thousands of people.  It is thus impossible for him or her 
to maintain satisfactory links to most constituents.  Alliances with newly 
empowered intermediaries enable legislators to do this much more adequately.  
And since those intermediaries can serve as a small army of backers when they 
next seek re-election,
13 their long-term political prospects grow brighter.   
 
     Legislators also find that reforms which empower numerous people at lower 
levels also ease dangerous jealousies directed against them by political activists 
lower down – including activists in their own parties.  When the only prize 
available is the legislator’s job, he or she inevitably becomes a target of 
resentment.  But when many new posts on elected councils or in other spheres 
are created through political reforms, ambitious people at lower levels suddenly 
have prizes that they can win without displacing the legislator.  This too can 
enhance the latter’s chances of long-term political survival.                      
 
     Political reforms offer useful compensations not just for politicians but for 
bureaucrats at lower levels.  Even as the latter lose some of their old powers, 
they tend to be empowered in new ways as a result of reforms.  They often find 
that when elected local councils are created, the amount of information 
reaching them from people at the grassroots increases massively – as ordinary 
people bring their concerns and demands to the attention of councillors who 
pass the word on to bureaucrats.  The latter realise for the first time how poorly 
                                                             
13   See for example, J. Manor, “Small-time Political ‘Fixers’ in Indian States: ‘Towel over Armpit’”, 
Asian Survey (September-October, 2000).    17
informed, and thus comparatively disempowered, they were before.  They also 
receive warnings of problems (incipient droughts, floods, and outbreaks of 
disease in remote localities) sooner than before – soon enough to respond in 
time to prevent them from becoming full-scale disasters.  This enables them to 
preserve people’s livelihoods and save lives.   Their job satisfaction increases 
as a result.  These things tend to ease their resentments at the loss of certain 
powers, so that over time, it often becomes less necessary to press them to 
behave more responsively.   
 
     Such advantages, plus pressure from above, sometimes persuade low-level 
bureaucrats to support or at least to acquiesce in political reforms.  But even 
when they do so, another problem often arises.  Those who attempt to become 
more accessible and responsive struggle to understand how to avoid actions 
that unintentionally alienate ordinary people.  As one Ugandan observer noted, 
“they don’t know how to do it”. 
 
     After a lifetime of issuing orders, being authoritative and acquiring what 
Indian civil servants call ‘the habit of command’, they find it hard to become 
good listeners and open-hearted accommodators.  They often hold meetings in 
their well-appointed offices – settings that intimidate ordinary people (and even 
some civil society activists) who are drawn into discussions.  They tend to 
conduct meetings along conventional lines.  The minutes of previous meetings 
are gone through and agreed, and then agendas (which government actors have 
often largely set) are waded through.  The concerns of ordinary people and 
their representatives may only be raised at the end of long discussions under 
‘any other business’, by which time those people feel still more intimidated and 
marginalised.  These problems may sound trivial, but they can do significant 
damage.  There are, as we shall see in Part III, ways of addressing this problem.     
 
     Finally, it is worth stressing that it is harder to persuade state actors to 
behave more responsively in some circumstances than in others -- see Box 4.  
Governments introducing reforms in the teeth of these conditions need to be 
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Box 4: Political Reform is Especially Difficult in Certain Sectors 
 
     It is especially difficult to persuade state actors who operate in certain 
sectors to behave more responsively, and to pursue political reforms that 
make policy processes more open.  Four (sometimes overlapping) types of 
sectors pose especially serious problems.    
 
  When government employees in a particular sector have 
traditionally acted as adversaries of many local residents:   The 
political reforms discussed here require public employees to 
become more open, accommodative and responsive to ordinary 
people.  In some sectors, this means that they must make a 
complete about-face from their previous roles.  For example, 
forest guards have long acted like gamekeepers, pursuing and 
arresting (often poor) local residents who gather forest products 
for food, fodder or fuel.  It is far harder for them to become 
accommodative than it is for teachers or health professionals 
whose roles and self-images have always (theoretically, and in 
many cases, actually) been as concerned carers. 
  When governments derive substantial tax revenues from a sector:  
Certain sectors – forestry and mining are examples – yield 
substantial revenues to governments.  These days, when most 
governments are extremely short of funds, it is especially difficult 
for them to part with such revenues.  They therefore  
(understandably) feel reluctant to turn those revenues over to 
local councils or communities.  This can impede the development 
of new, cooperative relations with people at the grassroots in such 
sectors. 
  When a sector yields substantial profits:  In some sectors – 
forestry is again the classic case – substantial, sometimes vast 
profits are made from the extraction and sale of certain products 
(for example, from logging).  Those profits may be made by 
private entrepeneurs, by politicians and by bureaucrats, or by all 
of these groups working in concert.  In such sectors, there is 
inevitably a reluctance to share even some controls with local 
residents. 
  When the management of a sector is technologically and/or 
technocratically complex:  Certain sectors are more complicated 
to manage than are others.  It is, for example, far more difficult to 
manage watersheds (where attention must be paid to ground water 
levels, well construction, the characteristics of catchment areas, 
soil erosion, etc.) than grasslands.
1  Government employees are 
much more reluctant to turn complicated sectors over to local 
representatives – whom they see as under-educated and 
unsophisticated.     19
     Part III contains further comments on ways of tackling resistance to political 
reforms, but let us now consider the specific issues identified in Part I. 
 
Devolution to Elected Multi-Purpose Councils   
 
      Certain conditions enhance the possibility that democratic decentralisation 
will produce change for the better.  Some of these are essential prerequisites, 
and others are merely helpful but not essential.  We need to distinguish between 
the two. 
 
     Some analysts claim that the list of essential prerequisites is quite long.  We 
hear, from various sources, that it is necessary to have prior land reform, a 
strong middle class, a vibrant civil society, a free press, prior experience of 
democracy, high literacy, etc.  Empirical evidence indicates that most of these 
things are helpful – although a strong middle class, while helpful in some ways, 
may crowd out disadvantaged groups.  But none of them is essential. 
 
     There is clear evidence from Bangladesh between 1985 and 1992, and more 
crucially from Mozambique in recent years, to indicate that decentralised 
systems and other similar initiatives can work tolerably well in the absence of 
these ‘helpful’ things.  In Mozambique, not a single item in the list above of 
alleged prerequisites is present, and yet a decentralised system has produced 
significant improvements over the previous, exceedingly centralised system
14 -- 
see Box 5.   
 
 
Box 5:    Reforms Can Produce Gains Even in Inhospitable Conditions: 
              Democratic Decentralisation in Mozambique 
 
     The government in Mozambique recently began an experiment with 
democratic decentralisation in roughly one-third of the country’s municipalities 
(municipios).  It did so amid conditions that were distinctly unpromising. 
 
     Literacy rates and other human development indicators were very low.   
Mozambique – both under Portuguese rule and since independence – had 
previously experienced only highly centralised rule.  The population had very 
little experience of elections, and no experience of electing local councils.  The 
middle class in most municipalities was miniscule.  Civil society was weak.  
Per capita incomes were among the lowest on earth. 
 
     And yet, the experiment had yielded important gains.  For the first time, the 
preferences of local residents influenced decisions about which development 
projects to pursue and how to implement them.  The positive popular response 
enabled municipal councils to obtain revenues from the imposition of fees 
                                                             
14   For evidence on Bangladesh, see Crook and Manor, Democratisation and Decentralisation…, 
chapter three.   20
which people had been unwilling to pay before.  This made it possible for the 
councils to undertake projects that made modest but significant contributions to 
local economic development.  The opportunity to achieve such things drew 
respected local figures into politics who had remained aloof previously, when 
over-centralisation offered them few incentives.  Their participation enabled 
the ruling party in Mozambique to attract new blood into its organisation which 
had grown dangerously complacent and stagnant.  And the popularity of 
decentralisation earned the government and the ruling party greater popularity 
and legitimacy – which it badly needed.  Civil society organisations -- which 
had been seriously underdeveloped -- engaged with these new, more responsive 
democratic institutions and the ensuing partnerships improved development 
outcomes.   
 
     In many developing countries, these changes would be seen as merely 
modest improvements.  But in Mozambique, where government had earlier 




Analyses of democratic decentralisation have demonstrated that there are only 
three essentials for such systems to work well – and these findings also apply 
to some of the other initiatives assessed in this chapter.   
 
  Adequate powers must be devolved to lower levels. 
  Adequate resources (especially financial resources) must be 
devolved.   
  Reliable mechanisms to ensure downward accountability must be 
created. 
 
If any one of these three elements is absent, systems or initiatives will fail.  If 
one or more are weak, then systems or initiatives will perform poorly. 
 
     Political leaders in developing countries often find it difficult to provide 
these three essentials.  This is to some extent understandable.  Tight budgetary 
constraints often make funds for devolution hard to find.  In all countries, 
leaders’ political subordinates and bureaucrats are reluctant to see funds and 
powers devolved.  Those same people strongly prefer upward accountability (to 
them) over downward accountability (to ordinary people).   
 
     But senior leaders who give in to these pressures pay a price.  They weaken 
or wreck decentralised institutions or other consultative initiatives which could 
produce developmental benefits and – not incidentally from their point of view 
-- enhance their government’s popularity and legitimacy. 
                                                             
15   These comments are based on the doctoral research of Fidelx Kulipossa at the Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex.   21
 
     Democratic decentralisation does not necessarily benefit poor, socially 
excluded people.  Prosperous groups may seize control of elected councils and 
exploit them for their own interests.  Disadvantaged groups – which have less 
in the way of confidence, political skills, resources, organisational strength and 
contacts than their better off neighbours – commonly have great difficulty in 
asserting themselves.  But we need to recognise that although they find it hard 
to gain influence within local arenas, they find it well nigh impossible beyond 
those arenas – at higher levels.  They usually face even more intimidating 
impediments when it comes to reaching upward and outward.  Their best 
chance of obtaining helpful responses from government usually lies at the 
grassroots.       
 
     Steps that governments can take to make elected local councils more likely 
to serve the interests of disadvantaged groups are discussed in Part III.  But it is 
worth noting that fresh evidence has emerged from a number of developing 
countries to suggest that democratic decentralisation may be of more help to 
those groups than some observers initially concluded – for three main reasons.  
First, in many local arenas, the overwhelming majority of people are quite 
poor, so that the improvements in governance that decentralisation often 
generates tend to reach large numbers of poor people.  Second – as we saw 
above -- over time, elites often feel compelled by electoral logic to compete for 
the (often numerous) votes of poor people, and to offer them significant 
benefits to achieve this.  Finally, it has now become clearer that over time, 
disadvantaged groups tend to acquire the confidence, skills and organisational 
strength to begin to compete with prosperous interests who possess these things 
in abundance from the start. 
 
Creating Single-Purpose ‘User Committees’ 
 
     Let us begin with a critically important question.  How often do user 
committees qualify as political reforms that empower ordinary people?   On 
present evidence, the answer appears to be: far less often than the promoters of 
user committees claim or believe.   
 
     It is worth stressing that user committees – unlike multi-purpose local 
councils – have proliferated so rapidly in recent years mainly because donor 
agencies press governments in developing countries to create them.  They have 
two great attractions for donors.  They liberate the field staff of donor agencies 
from the onerous task of micro-managing development projects – that task is 
devolved onto user committees.  And at least theoretically, user committees 
conform to donors’ desire to see the policy process become more open to 
bottom-up influence from ‘users, ‘stakeholders’, ‘consumers’ – from ordinary 
folk.   
   22
     The theory is admirable, but difficulties often arise in practice because 
governments in less developed countries tend to see user committees mainly as 
a requirement that they have to meet to obtain donor funds.  They are thus less 
committed to seeing them work as genuine political reforms than they were 
when (usually without donor pressure) they created multi-purpose local 
councils.  They therefore often tend merely to go through the motions required 
by the donors.      
 
     Four problems with user committees are especially troubling.       
 
  The methods used to select members of user committees raise doubts 
about their capacity to represent ordinary people – not only the poor, 
but the non-poor as well – at the local level.  In many cases, 
members are appointed from above by lower-level bureaucrats and 
politicians.  It appears that, more often, they are elected.  But the 
processes used in these elections tend to be less reliably democratic 
than those used to elect members of local councils – for example, 
voting is less secret.  Lower-level bureaucrats often have 
considerable discretion over who takes seats on these committees.  
Where this is true, it creates an invidious situation.  User committee 
members are supposed to exert influence over such bureaucrats and 
to render them downwardly accountable.  But if they owe their 
places on the committees to these very people, this is unlikely. 
  If these dubious selection procedures prevent the non-poor at the 
grassroots from exercising influence, they make it even less likely 
that poor and socially excluded groups will be able to do so.  Lower-
level bureaucrats who manipulate the selection process are often 
inclined to favour the more ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘respected’ 
members of local communities – that is, elites. 
  User committees are often woefully short of power.  They are 
seldom short of funds -- the current enthusiasm for them among 
donors usually sees to that.  But they often lack discretionary power 
over the design or even the implementation of government policies 
and programmes.  When that is true, they become mere conduits for 
government and donor funds.   If they cannot adapt policies to 
distinctive local conditions, or bring local preferences to bear, then 
they can achieve next to nothing. 
  Finally, there is often considerable dissonance between single-sector 
user committees and elected, multi-purpose local councils.  This is a 
complex matter, but in brief, they often exist at slightly different 
levels, the jurisdictional boundaries between them are unclear, and 
damaging problems result.  Above all, differences in their levels of 
funding create major difficulties.  It is not uncommon to find, cheek 
by jowl in the same locality, a multi-purpose local council which has 
far too little money to perform the tasks assigned to it (unfunded 
mandates) and single-purpose user committees that have far more   23
funds than they can manage effectively (excessively funded 
mandates).  Either problem is a recipe for trouble, and when they 
exist alongside one another, the results can be destructive to both sets 
of institutions – and to local development.  
 
     The news about user committees is not, however, all bad.  Some 
governments have made serious efforts to ensure that user committees are 
selected by genuinely democratic means and that they have adequate powers.  
In political systems that are substantially closed, their introduction – even when 
they work imperfectly – can have a potent and constructive psychological 
impact since it serves as an important early step towards prying such systems 
open.
16  And, as we shall see in Part III, there are ways to enhance the creative 
promise of user committees. 
 
Other Devices to Promote Bottom-Up Participation and Empowerment  
 
     An extensive menu of devices exists which governments may use to 
enhance bottom-up participation and downward accountability.  Some have 
only been adopted in a small number of countries, and it is sometimes difficult 
to make some work well.  But each offers enough promise to justify their 
inclusion here.
17  A number of them – especially the first three in the list below 
-- are often linked to elected local councils.  Several might be – but seldom are 
– linked to user committees.  Some entail partnerships between governments 
and civil society organisations (a topic which is discussed further below), but 
they are sometimes deployed on their own.   
 
1.  Mass local-level meetings to deliberate on development issues   Many 
decentralised systems require elected members of local councils to hold public 
meetings open to all adult residents at regular intervals – usually every few 
months.  These are supposed to give ordinary people an opportunity to voice 
their concerns and preferences – and in some cases to register formal 
judgements on elected councils’ actions and plans.  The record of these devices 
is disappointing.  Elected officials dislike such meetings since they often face 
criticism and even censure.  They therefore often fail to publicise or even to 
hold them, or they hold them at times when most local residents cannot attend, 
or they structure agendas in ways that prevent citizens from influencing 
important decisions.  Local residents naturally tend to lose interest in whatever 
meetings are held, since little of importance happens at them, and attendance 
wanes.  This widely used device therefore usually (there are exceptions) has 
limited impact.   
 
                                                             
16   This is apparent, for example, from communications from UNDP and UNCDF personnel who have 
worked in Vietnam.  
17   This discussion draws heavily on A.M. Goetz and J. Gaventa, Bringing Citizens Voice and Client 
Focus into Service Delivery, Working Paper 138, Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex, July, 2001.   24
2.  Direct democracy at the local level   In a tiny number of cases – the most 
notable being the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh -- high-level politicians who 
have become concerned about unresponsive local councils have transferred 
decision-making powers from councils to the kinds of local mass meetings 
described just above.  In so doing, they have attempted to switch from 
representative democracy to direct democracy.  It is too early to say how this 
approach will work in practice – the Madhya Pradesh experiment commenced 
only in early 2001 -- but there are reasons to worry.  Elected local councillors 
are reluctant to cede power to mass meetings.  They will often seek to go 
through the motions, but to retain their former powers by informal means.  
Some council leaders may actually find it easier to capture inordinate powers in 
mass meetings than when they face other elected councillors.  Monitoring, in a 
huge number of widely dispersed localities, may be beyond the capacity of 
governments.  And even where power is genuinely transferred to mass 
meetings, there are doubts about whether they can effectively make decisions 
on a wide array of issues.  Representative institutions may be better equipped to 
do that.  So direct democracy appears unlikely to provide an adequate check on 
the arbitrary use of power.  
 
3.  Incorporating pro-poor civil society organisations into decentralised systems       
Another approach is to give a role within decentralised systems to civil society 
organisations that seek to assist poor, socially excluded groups.  This has had 
considerable success in, for example, the Philippines (see Box 6).  The main 
problem here is that most governments are reluctant to grant civic associations 
the kind of legitimacy which this entails – not least because their 
representatives are unelected.  But the efficacy of this option might persuade 
governments to overcome their reluctance  
 
Box 6:   The Formal Incorporation of Civil Society Organisations into 
              Local Councils – The Philippines  
 
     Civil society organisations – including many grassroots people’s 
associations and pro-poor organisations – have been formally integrated into 
the strong system of democratic decentralisation in the Philippines.  These 
organisations and the disadvantaged groups whom they represent have been 
very substantially empowered thanks to decisions to assign them a diversity of 
important roles in the system. 
 
     Two seats are reserved for civil society organisations on committees to 
oversee the selection of contractors bidding to undertake public works.  They 
are also represented on regional development councils that make key decisions 
on development policy and the autonomy of local bodies.  They make up not 
less than 25 percent of the members of special advisory bodies to local councils 
(local health boards, peace and order councils, law enforcement boards, etc.) 
which propose annual budgetary allocations, and advise on personnel issues, 
and operations reviews.  Civic associations also have seats on local legislative   25
bodies at three levels in the decentralised system, and on project monitoring 
and evaluation committees at all three levels.  
 
     The actual working of these arrangements is not problem free, but leading 
analysts of the system have concluded that they have “presented non-
governmental organizations and people’s organizations with an immense 
opportunity to increase the scale and impact of their participation in politics”.
18 
 
4. Instruments to permit action to secure citizens’ rights    Rights that have been 
extended in theory to disadvantaged groups often fail to be realised in practice.  
One way to make their realisation more likely is to provide mechanisms that 
enable those groups (or their allies) to petition governments when the latter fail 
to deliver.  The petitioning can occur in courts, or before ombudspersons or 
special commissions.  Such devices not only give poor, socially excluded 
groups some hope of better treatment, they also sometimes provide 
opportunities to mobilise these groups round rights issues.       
 
5.  Devices to improve access to information and services    Some governments 
have established ‘single-window’ offices quite near the local level to which 
ordinary people can turn to access basic government services (like the issuing 
of permits, certificates and deeds) where their prices are clearly listed.  This 
can help curtail the demands for bribes for these services by government 
employees.  In other cases, wages rates payable by government contractors to 
poor people who help to build public works (and sometimes the full lists of 
persons who are to be paid) must be listed openly at the local level.  This can 
curtail underpayments and the inflation of muster roles by corrupt contractors 
and officials.  These devices, which operate at the local level, have greater 
impact than nationwide ‘freedom of information’ acts, although such acts can 
provide public interest lawyers (working with poor people) with opportunities 
to file successful suits.       
 
6.  Exercises in participatory auditing   Another way to elicit information about 
how money is used – and to disseminate it among poorer people and indeed the 
non-poor – is to mount public hearings at which the actual spending of 
government funds within a local arena is revealed and discussed by ordinary 
people.  This is sometimes done by civil society organisations, but it can also 
be initiated by governments, or by both together.  This enables those at the 
receiving end of public services to see whether funds supposedly committed to 
services were actually spent, were stolen, or were used for inappropriate 
purposes.  When irregularities are revealed in these exercises – and in the 
processes described in the previous item – it tends to have a powerful 
galvanising effect upon ordinary people.  
                                                             
18   L.C. Angeles and F.A. Magno, “The Philippines: Decentralization, Local Governments and Citizen 
Action” in P. Oxhorn, J. Tulchin and A. Selee (eds.) Decentralisation, Civil Society and Democratic 
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7.  Initiatives to change the ethos and behaviour of government employees  
Some governments have sought to persuade low-level employees to behave 
more helpfully and responsively towards local residents.  Two main approaches 
have been adopted here.  The first, which is quite widespread, entails training 
in participatory methods for appraisal, monitoring, etc.  The second, which has 
been pioneered in an impoverished region of Brazil, entails government 
publicity campaigns to emphasise the vitally important roles that health 
workers, teachers and others play, plus awards (that are again publicised) to 
individuals and local units that succeed in these tasks (see Box 7).  The aim 
here is to generate high morale among low-level government employees, and 
popular expectations and appreciation for whatever good work they do.  Both 
sets of devices have considerable promise. 
 
Box 7: Publicity and Incentives to Inspire Government Employees   
 
     In the late 1980s, the government in the Brazilian state of Ceara – an 
impoverished, badly underdeveloped region which had suffered severely from 
rent-seeking and patronage politics – adopted a new approach to development.  
It recruited a large number of new employees from among people with very 
limited skills and trained them to deliver based services – perhaps most 
crucially in the health sector.  It paid special attention to inspiring a sense of 
commitment in these employees.  This issue has received far too little attention 
from development specialists who expect state failure, but it has long loomed 
large in the literature on increasing productivity in the private sector.   
 
     The government sought to promote inspiration in several ways.  It provided 
recruits to the basic health care cadre with training well in advance of anything 
they could have hoped for previously, so that they felt that their status had been 
raised substantially.  It mounted a major publicity campaign that stressed the 
vital importance of the employees’ work among ordinary folk.  This 
strengthened their sense of pursuing a ‘calling’ and their esprit de corps.  It had 
them all wear tee shirts identifying them as health practitioners, and as local 
resident saw them moving from house to house on their rounds, they concluded 
that the publicity was matched by meaningful action.   
 
     Most of these employees lived within the communities where they worked, 
so that local bonds of trust and popular appreciation contributed still further to 
their commitment.  The state government cleverly hired women for the great 
majority of new posts, in the knowledge that the gatekeepers between  
households and the health services were almost always women.   
 
     The government’s publicity campaign was further reinforced by prizes that 
the government gave – and again publicised – for high achievement.  The 
practitioners responded with a willingness to take on a wider range of tasks 
than were strictly required of them.  And their sense of mission, and the   27
expectations of ordinary people that they would act responsibly (which exerted 
subtle pressure upon them), substantially curtailed any inclination that they 
may have felt to engage in rent-seeking.   
 
     The results of all of this were impressive.  A spectacular reduction in infant 
deaths was achieved in a region that had had a very poor record in this vein.  
Vaccination rates for dangerous diseases trebled.  Health care coverage across 
the state’s counties expanded dramatically.
19 
 
     This case is well known among analysts of development, but it has received 
far less attention from governments in developing countries than it deserves.   
 
 
8.  Incentives and sanctions for government employees   Many governments 
have introduced performance assessments and performance-related pay in 
connection with reforms in the public sector that have been inspired by neo-
liberal approaches.  These can be adapted to cover responsiveness to citizens, 
with emphasis upon poor, traditionally excluded groups.  They can also be 
coupled with the morale-building publicity campaigns noted just above.  It is 
sometimes difficult to achieve these things, given the weakness of 
bureaucracies in some developing countries, but they have promise.  It is very 
important that performance targets and quite specific penalties for failures to 
perform be clearly set out.     
 
9.  Exercises in participatory planning   The participatory methods mentioned 
above can also be used to involve ordinary people (and their preferences) in the 
planning of local development projects.  Given the reluctance of local leaders 
(elected or unelected) to take these exercises seriously, publicity campaigns in 
advance of such exercises are often helpful.  So are energetic campaigns by 
ruling parties and government bureaucracies to mobilise people to take part – 
such as have occurred in the Indian state of Kerala, where the campaign was 
linked to local councils.    
 
10.  Joint management with civil society organisations of development 
programmes   Governments which have limited administrative capacity to 
deliver goods and services, or governments whose leaders suspect that their 
employees are not administering programmes properly, may find it useful to 
draw civil society organisations that are active at the grassroots in as partners.  
Those organisations sometimes enjoy greater legitimacy than do governments – 
especially where the government’s management of, say, common property 
resources is hotly disputed by local residents, or where recent severe conflicts 
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have caused people in some regions and localities to see a government as their 
adversary.     
 
     We shall return to these devices in Part III, but the reference to civil society 
in the last comment above reminds us if the utility of links between reforming 
governments and civic organisations.  Let us consider this further. 
 
Enlisting Support from Sections of Civil Society 
 
     We saw in Part I that it is important for governments which are committed 
to the Millennium Development Goals, and which may need political support 
from the poor, to seek help from pro-poor organisations within civil society.  
They do so in part because those organisations can help to make political 
reforms sustainable, and to ensure that poor and excluded groups benefit from 
such reforms.  But it is not always easy for governments to do this.        
 
     Many senior government figures have reservations about civil society.  
Some believe that it has less legitimacy than governments – especially if the 
latter are elected, but even if they are not.  Some also worry that if they allow 
civil society to acquire strength, elements within it will become adversaries.   
 
     But leaders who have overcome their hesitations and encouraged pro-poor 
civil society organisations have usually discovered that their governments’ 
legitimacy in the eyes of people at the grassroots is enhanced as a result.  This 
is especially important after a spell of severe conflict that has persuaded large 
numbers of people that their government is a hostile force, or after years of 
unresponsive or even brutish behaviour by governments.  But even 
governments that have behaved more positively often face serious problems of 
popular apathy, alienation and even cynicism.  
 
     When a government adopts constructive postures towards pro-poor civic 
associations, it usually helps to persuade ordinary folk – including the poor -- 
that government is at least a somewhat benign force.  This message can be 
driven home with great effect when, in ways noted below, such associations 
help to enhance the positive impact at the local level of governments’ political 
reforms and other development policies.  Central to all of this is the fact – 
which perceptive political leaders grasp – that pro-poor civil society 
organisations are often far more capable of achieving certain crucial things than 
any state actor can be.  They are thus immensely valuable allies. 
 
     This will become clearer if we examine different types of activities 
undertaken by pro-poor civil society organisations -- or by organisations 
consisting of poor, excluded groups themselves.
20   
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1.  Disseminating information among disadvantaged groups about political and 
policy processes and public affairs more generally – to raise their awareness   
This is sometimes done through the media – especially radio or television, 
since many poor people are illiterate (see for example Box 8).  It can also be 
done through direct contact at the local level, as when pro-poor civil society 
organisations in a number of countries place details of government poverty 
initiatives and other policies into the hands of local dwellers, so that they know 
of opportunities available to them.  In countries where the media are state-
owned, the first requires the active support of government actors.  The second 
can profit mightily from state assistance – as when political actors provide civil 
society organisations with detailed information on programmes and policies -- 
but mere tolerance from government is all that is necessary there.       
 
Box 8: A Radio Soap Opera about Democratic Decentralisation 
 
     In the mid-1990s, scholars working in a civil society organisation to support 
democratic decentralisation in Karnataka state, India, persuaded the 
government-controlled station of All India Radio in the city of Mysore to 
broadcast a soap opera to inform ordinary people about the workings of elected 
local councils.  The academics drew on their studies of the councils to write the 
scripts and the radio station invited popular actors to play the parts of various 
stock characters in what became a popular 26-episode series. 
 
     The characters were quirky and human enough to entertain listeners, and 
there was no shortage of humour in the scripts.  But the broadcasts also 
informed listeners both about the problems faced by local councillors and their 
constituents and about the powers, resources and achievements (real and 
potential) of the councils.  They also showed how ordinary folk – including 
women and the poor – could exercise some influence over elected 
representatives and thus the policy process.  The soap opera had such success 
that the Prime Minister’s Office in New Delhi is considering the replication of 
this experiment across much of India.     
 
 
2.  Participatory processes at the grassroots to generate basic information  Well 
established techniques for participatory appraisal – plus surveys and focus 
groups – can yield an understanding of the problems, concerns and preferences 
of poor and excluded groups.  When such information is then fed into policy 
processes, it can assist sympathetic governments in designing and 
implementing policies that address the needs of those groups.     
 
3.  Citizen-based monitoring and evaluation   The same methods can also be 
used to enable poor, excluded groups to assess government initiatives as they 
impinge upon their localities.  One way of doing this is to develop ‘report   30
cards’ on the performance of urban governments (see Box 9) – and similar 
efforts are used in rural areas in several developing countries.      
 
 
Box 9:    A ‘Report Card’ on Public Services in Calcutta 
 
     The Public Affairs Centre – an independent non-profit organisation in 
Bangalore, India – worked with local partners to undertake a ‘report card’ on 
service delivery in the city of Calcutta.  It conducted surveys among 3,309 non-
poor households and 537 poor households in six carefully selected sections of 
the city.   
 
     Discussions with focus groups preceded the development of the 
questionnaire, so that local residents’ perceptions of the problems that they 
faced could influence its content.  Among other things, this enabled 
investigators to learn which services were seen by the non-poor and the poor as 
most essential.  Non-poor households were asked about eight different public 
services (telephones, electricity, government hospitals, water supply, 
corporation tax, ration depots, the post office and the police).  Poor households 
were asked about 13 – which included all except taxation listed above plus 
street lighting, the Metro railway, transport more generally, public sector 
banks, and sewage services.   
 
     The results are immensely enlightening.  It is clear that levels of satisfaction 
with various services varied greatly among both sets of respondents.  The 
‘report card’ also extracted insights into levels of satisfaction with three 
dimensions of various services: the behaviour of government employees, the 
speed with which matters were processed, and the information provided by 
government employees.  Further evidence was gathered on the details of 
individuals’ interactions with various agencies, including demands for bribes. 
 
     This ‘report card’ provides a great mass of information to guide municipal 
authorities in their efforts to improve services – indeed, at least one Indian 
municipality commissioned a ‘report card’ exercise.  This information also 





4.  Social auditing of government spending   Civil society organisations can 
also conduct public hearings at the local level at which information on 
government outlays on local development projects – especially but not only 
employment-generation schemes – are revealed and then assessed by the 
disadvantaged groups which they are supposed to help.  Such exercises enable 
members of these groups to determine whether they received funds allotted to 
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them and whether projects were actually implemented.  This can generate 
pressure against corrupt activities by low-level bureaucrats, politicians and 
contractors – and reinforce efforts by higher-level state actors to curb these 
malpractices.  In Bolivia, for example, such mechanisms (in the form of 
vigilance committees) have been legally incorporated into the local government 
system.    
 
5.  Lobbying state actors to influence planning and the design and 
implementation of development programmes   Civil society organisations often 
reach out to bureaucrats and elected officials at both high and low levels in 
attempts to inject greater bottom-up input into policy processes.  They also 
seek to enable poorer individuals and groups to lobby with state actors – by 
encouraging contacting, bridge-building, petitioning and demonstrations of 
discontent or support.  Examples can be found in a diversity of countries – a 
coalition of social movements in Nicaragua, a loose farmers network in 
Thailand, a nationwide coalition of fisherfolk in the Philippines.  Such efforts 
promote horizontal integration among civic associations within dispersed 
localities, and vertical integration between local associations and higher-level 
non-governmental organisations.     
 
6. Seeking access to justice for poor, excluded groups   Some civil society 
organisations attempt to help people from poor and socially excluded groups 
gain access to legal processes which might help to secure their rights or end 
injustices.  Two kinds of related activities occur here.  First, some associations 
initially seek to explain to poor people that courts or adjudicators like 
ombudspersons exist and might actually assist them – which is sometimes a 
novel idea to illiterate, repressed people.  Such people’s encounters with 
government actors have often been bruising, so that they take some convincing 
that an arm of government might right wrongs – especially when those wrongs 
have been committed by other government agencies.  Poor people 
understandably see the courts and other tribunals as elements of an 
undifferentiated thing called ‘government’, and it must be explained that these 
bodies have sufficient independence of the executive to render independent 
judgement – provided of course that in a specific country they really are that 
independent.  Civil society organisations then attempt to provide poor people 
with basic legal literacy, so that they are capable of perceiving when resort to 
law may be justified, and how to proceed when it is.  Second, public interest 
law specialists – sometimes grouped in associations that are distinct from the 




     All of these efforts by pro-poor civil society organisations can assist 
reformist governments that are pursuing the Millennium Development Goals, 
on two broad fronts.  They provide direct help to disadvantaged groups at the 
local level whom such governments wish to reach – by developing their skills,   32
confidence and organisational strength, and by fostering collective engagement 
with state actors and with poor and pro-poor organisations in other localities 
and at higher levels.  They also enhance the likelihood that political reforms 
will succeed.  Pro-poor organisations can enhance the reach and effectiveness 
of reforms.  They do so by informing poor people at the grassroots of the 
existence of policies and processes which low-level bureaucrats may be 
reluctant to reveal or incapable of publicising effectively.  They might, for 
example, inform local residents of a government order that official wage rates 
on public works projects be made known, to curtail under-payment by corrupt 
officials and contractors, or of the amounts of development funds transferred 
by central government to local officials or councils for development.   
 
      Pro-poor organisations (often working with local councillors) are also 
better equipped than are state actors to demonstrate how local residents may 
benefit from government initiatives in terms that ordinary folk can understand.  
They can for example explain the utility of attending and speaking out at public 
meetings convened by local councillors, of taking advantage of programmes 
for new schools, or inoculations against dangerous diseases (see Box 10). 
 
 
Box 10: Civil Society Organisations and Democratic Decentralisation  
               Can Increase the Uptake on Vitally Important Health Services  
 
      When elected councils were created at the local level in the Indian state of 
Karnataka in 1987, officials in the health ministry were in for a pleasant 
surprise.  For years, health professionals at the grassroots had struggled to 
persuade mothers in villages to bring their children to clinics for post-natal 
check-ups and inoculations.  Mothers had kept away because they and their 
children were frightened by the intrusive procedures – not least the sight of 
needles used for vaccinations.  When the councils were established, other 
villagers – the neighbours of young mothers – took seats on council sub-
committees for women’s and child welfare.  Health professionals asked for 
help from the councillors and local civil society organisations in persuading 
mothers to bring their children for post-natal care.  The councillors and civic 
activists then explained the benefits of such care in ways that village women 
could understand – in ways that were beyond the capacity of health 
professionals (who in any case were intimidating strangers and not 
neighbours).  As a result, far more mothers began accessing these services, 
many illnesses were prevented and lives were saved.  Officials in the health 
ministry swiftly became enthusiasts for democratic decentralisation and civil 
society. 
 
     It is thus in the interests of governments that undertake these initiatives to 
lend support to pro-poor civil society organisations.  They can do so as part of 
their overall strategies, by urging politicians and bureaucrats at all levels – 
especially lower levels -- to be open and responsive in their dealings with such   33
organisations.  When this happens, partnerships can develop between 
governments and civil society organisations that enhance the influence and 
creativity of governments – even in settings that appear unpromising (see Box 
11).  More specific actions in this vein are set out in Part III.   
 
Box 11:  Indonesia: A Newly Elected Local Council and Pro-Poor 
             Civic Associations Reinforce One Another  
 
     In 1999, in the town of Surakart central Java, marginalised groups linked 
their various civil society organisations – 20 in all – into a “solidarity” 
confederation.  It consists of associations of pedicab drivers, hawkers, sex 
workers, parking attendants, the disabled, domestic workers, and others.  They 
claim that it represents as many as 20,000 local residents. 
 
     It has lobbied persistently with the newly created democratic local council 
to get pro-poor regulations passed.  Their links to the party that rules in the 
council have produced results.  For example, hawkers’ rights are now more 
secure, and parking attendants are now better protected against abuse from 
those to whom they issue tickets.  The confederation has developed ties to non-
governmental organisations that offer technical advice on local measures that 
can enhance the security and well being of various disadvantaged groups.  It 
uses this to draw up draft regulations which are often enacted by the council.  It 
also organises programmes on civic education for poor, marginalised people 
who belong to its constituent associations, so that they develop the confidence 
and skills to make the most of the new regulations and to press for further 
action by the authorities.
22 
 
     Democratic decentralisation and civil society have thus strengthened one 
another.  The creation of an elected local council has opened up new 
opportunities for associations of disadvantaged people, and persuaded those 
people to join and work within their associations.  And those civic groups have 
reached out to larger non-governmental organisations for help, and have used it 
to feed the local council with ideas that can have a significant pro-poor impact 
– which in turn inspires further effort from the confederation.      
 
Encouraging Elite Competition for the Support of Poor and Excluded Groups   
 
     Competition that develops among elites for the political support of these 
groups can do more to include and empower them than many of the other 
things assessed in this chapter.  And it can assist them even when other 
initiatives fail or are not attempted – although, as we shall see, those initiatives 
tend to catalyse elite competition.  There is also clear evidence that elite 
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competition can assist substantially in achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals – see Box 12.    
 
Box 12:  Elite Competition for the Support of Poor People Can Help to  
              Achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
 
     Sri Lanka has long been well known for its high scores on the Human 
Development Index despite comparatively low per capita incomes.  It 
outperforms numerous more wealthy countries.  Some commentators have 
attributed this to the influence that left-of-centre parties have had in the island’s 
politics.  Those parties certainly made a contribution, but Sri Lanka had made 
great strides well before parties of the left achieved influence there at the 
election of 1956.  The main explanation lies in elite competition for the support 
of poorer voters. 
 
       From 1931 onwards – first under British rule, and then as a sovereign 
nation after independence in 1948 -- Sri Lanka had a national legislature 
elected by universal suffrage.  Legislators selected ministers who headed 
government departments such as health, education, local government, 
agriculture and lands.  The men who became ministers were all elitists, and 
most were rather conservative in their politics – only one in the years before 
1956 described himself as a social democrat.  But since they were bound 
together only very loosely in a political organisation until well into the 1950s, 
they tended to compete with one another for popularity.  The best way for a 
minister to achieve popularity was to ensure that his ministry delivered 
extensive benefits to ordinary people.  So despite their elitism, major efforts 
were made to eradicate diseases like malaria (a major scourge in the island), to 
promote mass education, so settle impoverished peasants on plots of 
uncultivated land, etc.  The result, well before left-of-centre parties achieved 
power in 1956, was substantial progress on most aspects of what we now call 
the Human Development Index.
23          
 
 
     But many governments in developing countries find it difficult to do some 
of the things that encourage elite competition.  In one-party (or no-party) 
systems, or in multi-party systems where one party dominates, ruling parties 
are not surprisingly reluctant to provide opportunities for opposition parties.  
And in a more competitive system where the ruling party is seriously 
challenged by one or more opposition parties, it may again be exceedingly 
reluctant.   
 
     Many ruling parties have, however, recognised that to empower poorer 
groups at the grassroots, it is necessary to take calculated political risks by 
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opening spaces that opposition parties may occupy.
24  If for example powers 
and funds are devolved onto local councils, some of which opposition parties 
may control, three other things happen that appeal to ruling parties.  (i) The 
ruling parties which open these arenas up tend to get the credit for this 
decision, so that their legitimacy and popularity increase – even in localities 
that elect other parties to run the local councils.  (ii) By creating many new 
elected posts at the local level, or by introducing other devices to promote more 
bottom-up participation, ruling parties create opportunities for their own 
supporters at the grassroots.  This eases potentially troublesome alienation and 
apathy among them, and makes it possible to bring new blood into party 
organisations that may have grown stagnant.  (iii) Greater competition within 
local arenas enhances the likelihood that elites there will seek political support 
from disadvantaged groups – which can reinforce other pro-poor initiatives by 
senior leaders of ruling parties.              
      
     Another issue often has little to do with the question of opening up spaces at 
lower levels.  Senior leaders who undertake pro-poor initiatives from the 
national level -- and who seek to construct pro-poor coalitions, sometimes by 
reaching out to progressive social movements
25 -- often trigger efforts by at 
least some opposition parties to follow suit and appeal to the poor.  Those 
parties feel compelled to do this, lest the ruling party attract huge electoral 
support from the poor.  After the sweeping victory of President Luiz Ignacio 
Lula da Silva in Brazil, who drew huge support from poorer voters, it has 
become unthinkable for opposition parties to ignore the poor. 
 
     Inter-party competition for support among disadvantaged groups tends to 
breed similar competition at the local level between elites or leaders who may 
have only loose links to political parties.  Indeed, such competition between 
elites or leaders, or between factions within political parties, is often more 
important at lower levels than inter-party competition.  Whatever form the 
competition takes, it tends strongly to facilitate the inclusion and empowerment 
of disadvantaged groups.     
 
     This kind of competition inevitably implies an increase in political conflict 
at lower levels – although it is often moderated by the constraints of democratic 
institutions.  Such competition also implies an increase in political pressure 
from below, which will place officials (and possibly prosperous groups that are 
allies of governments) at lower levels under greater pressure.  These things 
frighten some senior leaders, but many recognise that they are crucial to the 
their efforts to assist poor people.  Only through such contestation can old 
                                                             
24   M. Grindle, Audacious Reforms:Institutional Innovation in Latin America and Africa (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 2000). 
25   It should be stressed that some social movements are hostile to open politics and to disadvantaged 
groups, and that in some developing countries, social movements of any substance are impossible to 
find.  But it is often possible for ruling parties to forge links with progressive social movements which 
possess considerable strength – especially in much of Latin America and parts of Asia, but not only 
there.   36
hierarchies – within society and at lower levels of government -- be challenged 
in ways that will bring the Millennium Development Goals within reach.  Some 
technocrats invariably find this a horribly untidy business, but that is what 
more open, democratic government is like.   
 
PART III:   FACILITATING POLITICAL REFORMS 
 
     What can governments do to increase the likelihood that reforms to make 
themselves more open, accountable and responsive – and helpful to poor, 
excluded groups – will succeed?  This is an important question because 
initiatives that fail can make things worse.   
 
     When they are introduced, nearly all of these reforms trigger increased 
participation by ordinary people – including disadvantaged groups -- who see 
an opportunity to exercise more influence over processes that affect their well 
being.  But increased participation on its own – without greater downward 
accountability of government actors to people at the local level or their 
representatives -- is insufficient.  Indeed, if participation meets no response 
from state actors, it can pose a problem. 
 
     If ordinary people find that what at first appears to be an opportunity for 
greater influence turns out, in practice, to be a cosmetic exercise – if they gain 
little or no new leverage – then they will feel conned and betrayed.  Their 
increased participation will soon lead to increased cynicism, alienation and 
anger towards government and all its works – and in many countries, there is 
plenty of that about already.  On the other hand, successful reforms consistently 
reduce cynicism, enhance governments’ popularity and legitimacy, and open 
the way to greater synergy
26 between state and society.  So how can 
governments enhance the chances of success?     
 
     They can take a number of actions that impinge directly on the local level.  
But there is also much that they can do at higher levels in their political 
systems which will, indirectly, make a difference in local arenas.  So the 
discussion that follows is not confined to interventions at the grassroots.  
 
Easing Fiscal Constraints 
 
     Governments can do little to free themselves from the severe fiscal 
constraints that are one of the defining features of developing countries today.  
But such is the enthusiasm among international donor agencies for reforms to 
enhance openness, accountability and responsiveness that governments which 
pursue these objectives are likely to receive increased aid.  There are more 
important reasons to undertake political reform – greater legitimacy for 
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reforming governments, better developmental outcomes, progress towards the 
Millennium Development Goals.  But for many governments, increased aid is 
no trivial matter.      
 
Tackling Resistance within Governments to Political Reforms  
 
     Political leaders can expect resistance to reforms that are intended to make 
government more open and to empower poorer groups.  We have seen that, at 
lower levels in political systems, it nearly always comes from politicians and 
especially bureaucrats.  This problem can be addressed in two main ways – 
with ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’. 
 
     ‘Sticks’, Disincentives:  Senior government figures need to be willing to put 
pressure on  politicians and bureaucrats at lower levels to discourage resistance.  
This is not as difficult as it may at first appear.  Leaders at the apex of power 
routinely use disincentives in their dealings with subordinate politicians.  And 
in many developing countries, leaning on minor bureaucrats – who are usually 
the main problem – is not a novel idea.  It has often been done before, during 
campaigns for public sector reform inspired by neo-liberal thinking.  A great 
many senior leaders regard low-level bureaucrats more as adversaries than as 
natural allies. 
 
      Once political reforms begin to draw poorer groups and civic associations 
at lower levels into democratic and participatory processes, senior leaders often 
find that they become valuable allies in pressing for compliance with those 
reforms.  If for example elected members of decentralised councils acquire 
some disciplinary powers over lower-level bureaucrats, they can be relied upon 
to use them to persuade or compel the latter to behave more responsively. 
 
     ‘Carrots’, Incentives:  As we have seen, the process of political reform is 
not a zero-sum game.  Politicians and bureaucrats at lower levels have to part 
with certain powers, but they also make some compensatory gains.  They 
receive far more information from below than before, which unexpectedly 
empowers them.  It arrives more quickly – enabling them to tackle potential 
problems that might mushroom into disasters early enough to prevent that.  
They discover that when ordinary people and civil society organisations at the 
local level acquire a stake in political and policy processes, they become less 
cynical about government and more willing to work helpfully with low-level 
officials – and to maintain development projects because they conform to local 
preferences.  They find that elected local councillors and civil society activists 
become something other than inveterate adversaries.  Those people can – 
among other things -- explain the logic of government programmes to ordinary 
people in terms that they understand, so that the uptake on those programmes 
increases and they have a greater chance of success.  This enables government 
employees to get things done which were impossible before political reform.  
All of this enhances their job satisfaction.    38
 
     Senior leaders can enhance that satisfaction further by publicising the vitally 
important roles that minor government servants play, and by offering them 
awards for good performance and other incentives.  The approach adopted in 
northeast Brazil – described in Box 7 above -- provides the classic example.  
Lower-level employees find that ordinary people recognise and applaud their 
work.  This raises the morale of those employees and in response, they often 
become more committed to public service and more supportive of political 
reform.  (When they under-perform, the increased public awareness also makes 
it more likely that they will feel the pressure of popular discontent.)   
 
Devolution to Elected Multi-Purpose Councils  
 
     Two questions loom large here.  First, what can governments do to help 
elected local councils operate effectively?  Second, how can governments 
maximise the chances that these councils will work for the benefit of poor, 
excluded groups?  Let us consider these questions in sequence. 
 
      So many governments in developing countries have experimented with 
democratic decentralisation that they need no urging to try it.  But in a great 
many cases, certain specific actions can help elected councils to operate more 
effectively.   
 
     Local councils need substantial decision-making powers, so that they can 
adapt development policies to distinctive local conditions and inject popular 
preferences into the development process.  Many governments have failed to 
grant enough of these, and some have clawed powers back after initially 
bestowing them.  Where governments have been generous – in the Philippines, 
Bolivia and a handful of Indian states for example – impressive achievements 
have been possible.  The political and policy processes have become more 
transparent, accountable, and responsive.  Development projects have become 
more sustainable.  Absenteeism and the overall amount of money diverted via 
corruption have sometimes declined – see Boxes 2 and 13.  Information flows 
between governments and society have increased substantially – in both 
directions.  Early warnings against potential disasters emerge more readily.  
The legitimacy of government is enhanced, and popular apathy and alienation 
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Box 13:    Democratic Decentralisation Increases Transparency and  
                Can Reduce the Overall Amount of Money Illicitly Diverted 
 
     The local council chairman was exasperated.  In the good old days, before 
they created elected local councils, he could skim off much more money than 
he could now that so many more people could see what was going on. 
 
     He explained to a visitor how things had worked just a few years before.  
Once a year when the documents came down from the government listing 
development spending for the next twelve months, he and another important 
politician would sit down behind closed doors with three bureaucrats up in the 
sub-district office.  They would slice off about 40% of the total and divide it up 
among themselves.  They would then present the remaining 60% or so to the 
people as 100% of the budget.  
 
     The arrangement was nearly foolproof.  Theoretically, someone in the sub-
district to go to the capital, investigate the details of the budget and deduce that 
grand theft had occurred.  But in reality, no one in this rural area had the access 
to do this, so the scam worked beautifully.  You could make real money in 
those days. 
 
     But when elected local councils were created, hundreds of people in the sub-
district – all the councillors in all the villages -- had easy access to information 
about the full budget.  If he tried to pocket a large amount, the group opposed 
to him on his council would immediately cry foul.  He and many other 
councillors could make small amounts by selling little bits of influence, but it 
was small change compared to the good old days.   
 
     People complained because so many more councillors were now involved in 
corruption.  But when you added it all up, the overall amount being stolen was 
far less.  Maybe 5% of the budget was diverted now, instead of 40% before – 
all because everyone could see what was happening.  It was very nice being 
chairman of his local council, but in financial terms, it cost him dearly.
27    
 
     It is also essential that they provide them with adequate financial resources.  
Councils can raise some of these locally – provided they are given significant 
revenue raising powers.  But most of their funds usually need to be devolved 
from above.  This does not require new spending, but rather the transfer of 
control or at least significant discretion over existing spending.  (If that method 
is used it does not risk fiscal irresponsibility, as some argue.  Nor does it make 
councils hopelessly dependent on higher authority, as others claim – as long as 
they have some powers to decide how to use the funds.)  And yet, many 
governments have devolved less than adequate funds and revenue raising 
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powers, which means that only some of the gains noted just above can be 
made. 
 
     Apart from these essential actions, certain other steps can improve the 
workings of local councils.  Governments can press elected councillors hard to 
conduct mass meetings at the local level regularly, and to allow them to be 
genuinely participatory.  Since it is hard to monitor this in many scattered 
localities, governments can seek the help of civil society organisations that 
work to build the capacity of local residents to interact effectively with local 
councillors and low-level bureaucrats, and to sensitise the latter to respond.  
They can also give elected councils influence over user committees and link 
councils with other mechanisms discussed in Part II to promote bottom-up 
participation.          
 
     Governments can also encourage and support official associations of leaders 
of elected councils at all lower levels where they exist.  Such associations have 
two virtues.  They enable council leaders to share insights about solutions to 
problems that they face in common, and about approaches that yielded 
developmental successes – which might otherwise remain unknown beyond 
isolated arenas.  This helps in ‘scaling up’, in replicating successful innovations 
across wide areas.  Second, such associations can provide council leaders with 
greater self-confidence and a powerful voice in the corridors of power.  Given 
the reluctance of many government actors in every country to see decentralised 
councils empowered, this is crucially important.     
 
     Finally, governments also need to be aware of dangers posed to the 
effectiveness of elected local councils from an unexpected source -- social 
funds, a device widely used to channel substantial sums into development.  
Social funds are explicitly intended to provide the poor with material resources, 
and they succeed at this much of the time.  But in numerous countries, they 
often undermine elected local councils and other bottom-up participatory 
mechanisms.  
 
     This happens when they have no connection to local councils that are badly 
under-funded.  The existence of well resourced social funds can persuade 
governments that enough money is reaching the local level that adequate 
funding for local councils is unnecessary.  And when local residents receive 
resources through social funds, their understandable tendency to disregard 
financially crippled local councils and other bottom-up mechanisms intensifies.  
So even as social funds ease the material deprivation of poor people, they may 
impede their empowerment.
28  It makes more sense to give elected local bodies 
influence over social funds – a useful way to ease their financial problems, 
while getting resources to poor people and contributing to their empowerment. 
                                                             
28   These problems became apparent at a two-day conference at the World Bank in June 2002.  I am 
especially grateful to Leonardo Romeo of the United Nations Capital Development Fund for insights 
on this issue.     41
 
     This has lately become clear to the World Bank, the main creator of social 
funds.  Its principal report on the subject acknowledges that “there is a danger 
of… actually weakening district [and, we might add, local] councils by 
preventing elected representatives from being held accountable for local 
decisions”, and that “few projects…have given significant responsibilities and 
decision making power to local governments”.  It adds that “social funds that 
work directly with communities [bypassing local councils] diminish a local 
government’s accountability to the population and inhibit its budgeting 
function…”.  The report also recognises that even “newly created local 
councils in difficult conditions” can deal successfully with resources from 
social funds.
 29  For this reason, social funds have focused more often on links 
to local councils since 1996 than before.
30  But the problem remains serious, 
especially in certain regions.
31                  
 
     Let us now turn to the second question.  What steps can governments take to 
maximise the chances that local councils will work to the benefit of 
disadvantaged groups?  Extra funds can be channelled to councils in localities 
or sub-regions that are especially impoverished, to address poverty and 
exclusion that arise from inequalities between locations – something that 
democratic decentralisation is good at.   
 
     Tackling poverty and exclusion that arise from inequalities within localities 
is more difficult – and it is usually the main problem.  Funds and development 
programmes can be earmarked for the poor, although this does not always 
prevent prosperous interests from diverting them.  Governments can support 
(or at least tolerate) efforts by pro-poor civil society organisations to enhance 
the capacity of disadvantaged groups to engage effectively with local councils.  
In a few cases – the Philippines, for example – such organisations have even 
been given formal roles within decentralised institutions (see Box 6 above).  In 
a larger number of cases, government officials have fed those organisations 
detailed information on programmes from which poorer people can benefit and 
on spending that is scheduled for specific localities.  This makes it possible for 
civic associations (i) to inform local residents of promising programmes and 
(ii) to help them to make use of information – for example, to detect diversions 
of funds intended for their locality.  Governments can also encourage 
competition among local elites for the political support of poorer voters.  
 
                                                             
29   World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, Social Funds: Assessing Effectiveness 
(Washington, The World Bank, 2002) pp. 39-40. 
30   Ibid., Table 4.1, p. 32 
31   Social funds have tended to work with local councils more often in Latin America and southern and 
eastern Europe and Central Asia (and to a lesser degree in Africa) than in the Middle East and in East 
and Southeast Asia where democratic decentralisation has made less headway than in other regions.  
Interview with two World Bank officials involved in evaluating social funds, Washington, 17 July 
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     Finally, seats on local councils can be reserved for members of poor, 
socially excluded groups.  This is often done for women, but it is more difficult 
to give poorer groups representation since they do not fall into a clearly 
recognisable social category – except in South Asia where caste makes this 
possible.  Reservations thus have serious limitations.  Where they are provided 
for women, it is crucial that those who obtain seats on local councils be elected 
and not nominated.  If they are nominated – usually by senior male leaders in 
the council, on whom they then depend – old patriarchal systems of control that 
facilitate the arbitrary use of power will be not undermined but reinforced.   
This is apparent from, inter alia, the Bangladeshi system that existed between 
1987 and 1992.  The limited utility of reservations makes it all the more 
important that governments encourage pro-poor civil society organisations to 
play a significant roles in decentralised systems. 
 
Creating Single-Purpose User Committees 
 
     User committees can be part of the solution to excessively centralised, top-
down government.  Or – if they are manipulated in ways that strengthen 
upward accountability and the cooptation of local interests – they can worsen 
the problem.   
 
     Governments that are interested in becoming more open and responsive and 
in empowering disadvantaged groups can take several steps to turn user 
committees to these purposes.  At higher levels in their systems, they can curb 
the inclination of many senior ministers and bureaucrats to adopt two damaging 
strategies.  These people sometimes prefer to pack user committees with pliable 
non-officials who will tamely permit bureaucrats to continue with top-down 
dominance.  And they often deny user committee members – however they are 
chosen – any significant influence over policy processes.   Both of these 
strategies entail a deception -- user committees give the appearance of 
openness and consultation without delivering anything of substance.  This is 
bound to inspire cynicism among ordinary people.  
 
     Even if they overcome these problems at higher levels, senior government 
figures must – as so often here – press bureaucrats at lower levels to comply 
with their aims.  The latter tend strongly to manipulate often less-than-secret 
election procedures (if any are used) to place pliable people on such 
committees.  Once members take their seats, bureaucrats seek to coopt them 
and deny them influence.  Effective surveillance against such practices is often 
comparatively easy with user committees because committee members provide 
a ready source of information on non-compliance by junior bureaucrats.  But 
those at higher levels of government must seek this information, systematically.  
 
     One other measure will help.  If, as is often the case, elected multi-purpose 
councils exist alongside user committees, the two sets of institutions can be 
integrated – in ways that give local residents or elected members of councils   43
significant influence over user committee decisions.  The precise arrangements 
vary.  In some places, user committees have been made sub-committees of 
local councils.  In others, elected councillors have been given powerful roles on 
user committees, or those committees’ decisions require approval from public 
meetings open to all local residents.   
 
     Whatever form the integration takes, it yields several benefits.  Since multi-
purpose councils are usually elected by more reliable democratic processes 
than user committees, it compensates for shortcomings in processes employed 
to select members of the latter.  Since user committees are often well funded by 
donors, it eases the financial problems that many local councils face.  Since 
multi-purpose councils often enhance the coordination of development work 
across individual sectors, it helps to ensure that projects in one sector resonate 
with those in others.  And yet, since user committees continue to possess 
something of a separate identity from local councils, it still provides ordinary 
folk with multiple channels through which to exercise influence and seek 
responses.  Constructive links between the two types of institutions have been 
established – with beneficial results -- in, for example, Tanzania and the Indian 
states of Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka. 
      
     It is still possible, of course, that user committees will be captured by 
prosperous interests so that poor and excluded groups gain little.  But the 
initiatives to provide the latter with leverage, suggested in the previous section 
on multi-purpose councils, can make a difference here as well. 
 
Other Devices to Promote Bottom-Up Participation and Empowerment 
 
     A diversity of other devices can help to make governance more open, 
accountable and responsive – and helpful to poor, excluded groups. 
 
1.  Mass local-level meetings to deliberate on development issues   These 
devices – which are often linked to elected local councils -- have had only 
limited impact, mainly because councillors seek to dilute or avoid them.  
Governments can urge low-level bureaucrats to ensure that genuine meetings 
occur, and they can seek help from civil society organisations to support this.  
But it is, logistically, very hard to penetrate into so many remote arenas and 
produce results.  Governments might therefore seek to reinforce these devices 
by undertaking consultations by other means – for example, through exercises 
in participatory appraisal, and surveys or focus groups that fix mainly on 
poorer, socially excluded groups. 
 
2.  Direct democracy at the local level   This has been attempted in only a tiny 
number of cases, and there are serious doubts about whether it will prove 
effective.  It is unrealistic to expect many governments to go over to direct 
democracy and, until clear evidence emerges of its success, it is probably wise 
to postpone such decisions.    44
 
3.  Incorporating pro-poor civil society organisations into decentralised systems   
This device is highly promising.  Indeed, despite some governments’ 
hesitations about civil society, it could produce greater gains than most of the 
other items in this list.  Governments may stop short of the kind of formal 
incorporation that has occurred in the Philippines, but even a less intimate but 
still genuine link between elected councils and civic associations would yield 
major benefits. 
 
4.  Instruments to permit action to secure citizens’ rights   These devices – to 
enable ordinary people to petition tribunals when rights promised them are not 
realised -- are again highly promising.  They are also comparatively easy to 
introduce.  And they follow logically from most governments’ commitments 
under various rights covenants.  The difficulty is in making the devices work.  
Two things can facilitate that: official publicity campaigns to make people 
aware of these instruments, and government encouragement to civic 
associations (especially but not only teams of public interest lawyers) to assist 
ordinary folk in understanding and accessing them.  In countries where the 
legal concept of locus standi is in use – which, when narrowly defined, permits 
only persons who have suffered injury to file petitions – the concept should be 
extended, as has happened in South Africa and India.  That would enable 
public interest lawyers to act on behalf of very poor people who are often 
inhibited.   
 
5.  Devices to improve access to information and services   These have been 
used in numerous countries, and they can have a potent impact at the 
grassroots.  They enable governments to give clear signals that they are serious 
about tackling corruption at the local level and empowering poor people.  If 
they are to be accessed on a significant scale by local residents, governments 
need to encourage civil society organisations to work towards that end. 
 
6.  Exercises in participatory auditing   Such exercises – public meetings at 
which spending on government projects is revealed and assessed by ordinary 
people -- can also have a dramatic impact within local arenas when local 
residents discover discrepancies between official accounts and what has 
actually been spent.  Governments often leave this to civil society 
organisations, although an official policy of at least tolerating such exercises is 
quite helpful.  But governments that proactively organise them, and invite civic 
associations to assist, produce greater benefits for disadvantaged groups -- and 
reap greater political support from them as a consequence.   
 
7.  Initiatives to change the ethos and behaviour of government employees  
Efforts to encourage lower-level government employees to behave more 
responsively again have substantial promise.  Many governments have 
provided these officials with training in participatory methods, which is quite 
helpful.  Few have adopted the even more promising approach pioneered in   45
northeast Brazil (see Box 7 above) – publicity campaigns to emphasise the 
value of work by employees charged with delivering services like education 
and health care, coupled with awards for high achievement.  This latter device, 
which is only just becoming known in many countries, is patently feasible even 
in impoverished areas and has few political drawbacks. 
 
8.  Incentives and sanctions for government employees   The use of 
performance targets, performance-related pay, and sanctions for poor 
performance can produce useful results.  In many countries, this would not be a 
major innovation, but rather an extension of practices adopted under neo-liberal 
models – with greater emphasis on the needs of the poor.  It is thus relatively 
easy to introduce.  It is, however, crucial to specify – very precisely and clearly 
– both performance targets and the penalties that will follow if they are not 
met.  If these are left vague, this strategy may yield little.      
 
9.  Exercises in participatory planning   These are already widely used, but they 
tend to be half-hearted and ineffective.  Governments can enhance their impact 
by publicising their determination to make them real, by enlisting help from 
pro-poor civil society organisations, and – if ruling parties have organisational 
strength – by efforts to mobilise people at the grassroots.   
 
10.  Joint management with civil society organisations of development 
programmes   This promising option is sometimes difficult for governments to 
pursue.  They may distrust civil society organisations, and feel reluctant to cede 
some of the responsibility for the management of development programmes to 
them.  But the often substantial improvements in the efficacy of such 
programmes and in the uptake on them by ordinary people will produce major 
benefits – for poor people and for governments’ standing in their estimation.  It 
is crucial, however, that governments avoid the strong temptation to use this 
device to coopt and control civic associations.     
        
Enlisting Support from Sections of Civil Society 
 
     The number of references in the previous section to the need for help from 
civil society organisations indicates that those organisations can serve as 
exceedingly valuable allies of reforming governments – on several fronts.  
Such organisations, especially those that consist in part of non-poor members, 
can help to develop broad social coalitions whose support for pro-poor 
initiatives is usually essential to success.  They can help to press lower-level 
bureaucrats who may resist reforms to comply with them.  They can also 
reinforce publicity campaigns by governments to build morale and a sense of 
mission among low-level employees engaged in sectors like health and 
education.  And in interactions with junior bureaucrats who seek to act more 
responsively but who unwittingly behave in ways that alienate ordinary people, 
civil society organisations can sensitise them.    
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     They can also reinforce governments’ efforts to reach out to poor, excluded 
groups in several specific ways discussed in Part II.  Governments can respond 
by lending support in the following areas.        
 
  They can encourage state-owned media to assist civic associations to 
disseminate information that can be of help to poorer groups at the 
grassroots.  The radio station that broadcast an informative soap 
opera on the workings of local government (noted in Box 8 above) 
was state-owned.  And nearer the local level in several countries, 
governments have fed detailed information to civic associations that 
seek to transmit it directly to poor, excluded groups.  
  They can welcome and make use of information from below -- on 
the problems and preferences of the poor – generated by civil society 
organisations.  
  They can respond to information that such organisations develop out 
of participatory exercises to monitor and evaluate government 
performance.  Indeed, they can actively seek such information – as 
one Indian municipality did when it commissioned a ‘report card’ 
exercise on its delivery of services (for an example of this type of 
exercise, see Box 8 above). 
  They can facilitate and respond to civic associations’ independent 
social audits.  Or (again) they can actively seek to promote such 
activities, as the Philippines government has done by incorporating 
them into its system of democratic decentralisation (see Box 6 
above).  They can welcome and respond to lobbying by poor or pro-
poor organisations at lower and higher levels in their political 
systems.  
  They can press lower-level bureaucrats and politicians to act 
responsively when poor people or civil society organisations 
representing them seek to lobby them. 
  They can assist civic associations’ efforts to promote access to 
justice -- in various ways.  They can encourage courts and 
ombudspersons to welcome initiatives from such groups, or even to 
reach out to them by delivering rulings that admit even crudely 
written messages from poor people as official petitions – as India’s 
Supreme Court has done.  They can attempt to sensitise the police 
who may be drawn into cases to behave sympathetically.  They can 
show appreciation for the efforts of civic associations and public 
interest lawyers that seek to provide access to justice.  Or they may 
go further, by creating legal aid funds to assist poor people with the 
costs of proceedings – or even by appointing public advocates to 
serve them (although in many cases, this task is better left to 
independent public interest lawyers).  They can also, where it is 
relevant, broaden the concept of locus standi – to enable public 
interest lawyers to represent poor people who are injured parties.     
   47
 
Box 14:  Several of These Actions Can Be Pursued Simultaneously   
 
     In the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, the government has sought to pursue 
several of these approaches at once, in informal partnership with a network of 
pro-poor civil society organisations.  The network, which includes numerous 
local-level civic associations, has been organised by a state-level organisation 
called Samarthan.  Its activists and those of associations allied to it concentrate 
their efforts on women and low caste and ‘tribal’ groups in urban centres and 
villages.  They have persuaded the government to provide them with details of 
official development programmes in a wide range of sectors, and make this 
available to disadvantaged people in three ways.  They publish a free 
newspaper in the local vernacular setting out the details of government 
programmes, the amounts of funds available under each in each locality, and 
the procedures to be followed to obtain them.  They have established 
information centres in a wide range of localities, at which the same information 
is available – and can be explained by activists.  And activists proactively 
contact disadvantaged groups, to acquaint them with this information and to 
build their self confidence, skills and organisational strength.   
 
     Activists also serve as intermediaries between those groups and nearby 
government officials, to help local residents to access the benefits from 
development programmes.  And they support associations of chairpersons of 
elected councils – partly to strengthen these associations, and partly to persuade 
council leaders to respond to requests from disadvantaged groups for a fair 
share of government resources.         
 
     The state government has sought to facilitate these efforts.  It sees the 
political utility of cultivating disadvantaged groups because they vote in huge 
numbers – their support enabled it to become one of the few state governments 
in recent times to be re-elected in 1998.  It also recognises that government 
programmes yield better, more sustainable results if local people participate in 
them.  It therefore presses lower-level officials to provide information and to 
respond to overtures from disadvantaged groups and from civil society activists 
working with them.  All of this has provided poor, excluded groups at the 
grassroots with substantial gains over the last eight years.
32   
 
 
     There are certain spheres in which governments can do relatively little to 
assist pro-poor civil society organisations, and others in which they may do 
unintended damage, so that the best approach is to leave things alone.   
 
                                                             
32   These comments are based on an extended field visit to two districts of the state, in the company of 
Samarthan activists, in April, 2002.   48
     They can do little to help in one crucial area – efforts by large pro-poor non-
governmental organisations to connect with civil society organisations at 
intermediate and local levels.  Senior government officials can press civil 
servants at those levels to deal sympathetically with civic associations when 
they are approached for information or help.  They can (as only some 
governments do) welcome donor funding of organisations making such efforts.  
But the main responsibility for the vertical integration of civil society 
organisations lies with those organisations themselves. 
 
     Governments are best advised to keep clear of direct involvement in a 
number of areas.  Two are especially important.  The first is micro-finance.  
There are examples of governments successfully developing their own micro-
lending programmes, or providing funds for civil society programmes.  But in 
most cases, government involvement creates difficulties.  Civil servants at 
lower levels tend to manipulate such initiatives in efforts to coopt and control 
civic associations working in this field – sometimes with encouragement from 
higher authority, but often in defiance of it.  And those civil servants (perhaps 
in league with intermediate-level politicians such as legislators) sometimes 
siphon off funds from micro-finance programmes.  Even when these wilfully 
destructive activities do not occur, government involvement often brings 
delays, excessive paperwork and other problems.  To succeed, micro-finance 
initiatives require sensitive, delicate handling of small groups of poor people at 
the local level – and civil society activists tend to be far more capable of this 
than government employees.  
 
     A second area is training – training for members of elected local councils, of 
user committees, or of lower-level bureaucrats or ordinary people who are 
involved with these institutions and with other devices to promote bottom-up 
input into development.  Civil society organisations have often developed 
imaginative, participatory training programmes for use among these varied 
groups.  Governments often seek to replicate and greatly extend these 
programmes by incorporating them into the curricula of their training 
academies.  Unfortunately, these efforts often founder because the academies 
are too wooden and unimaginative in their methods, or because governments 
are more concerned with the numbers of people who pass through such 
programmes than with their quality.      
 
     Finally, when governments contract out service delivery to civil society 
organisations – which is just one type of partnership with such organisations – 
they need to be sensitive to the possibility that such arrangements can do 
damage.  Contracting out often improves the effectiveness of service delivery, 
but can entail three potentially serious problems.   
 
  It can divide civil society by creating resentment between those 
organisations that are awarded contracts and those that are not.  This 
can undermine the unity of civil society and its capacity to perform   49
many important tasks -- especially in countries where it is rather 
weak and fragmented, but not only there.   
  Those civic associations that receive contracts may feel compelled to 
cut back on advocacy and lobbying on behalf of disadvantaged 
groups, lest those activities jeopardise existing or future contracts 
with governments.  Governments need to demonstrate that they 
welcome continuing efforts by civil society organisations in those 
other spheres.    
  Some governments give civil society organisations that become 
contracted partners little or no power to adapt service delivery to the 
distinctive conditions and people’s preferences in varied localities.  
This curtails creativity and may prevent services from meeting the 
needs of ordinary people in specific localities.  When this happens, it 
causes popular resentment that can undermine the credibility of both 
government and civil society organisations.  Governments need to 
empower those organisations to make adjustments that can enhance 
the local relevance of services.           
 
Encouraging Elite Competition for the Support of Poor and Excluded Groups 
 
     This goal must be pursued indirectly, by creating conditions that encourage 
elites to seek and compete for that support.  Our main concern here is 
competition at or just above the local level.  But higher levels also deserve 
attention because greater competition there tends to catalyse similar changes 
lower down. 
 
     Several steps may be taken to encourage this.  Those that are most obvious 
have to do with relations between ruling parties and the opposition.  
Governments that have placed restrictions on opposition parties can ease them, 
in order to inspire multi-party competition.  (They are often reluctant to do so, 
but such actions are likely to be widely popular.)  More often, ruling parties 
that have sought by illiberal means to dominate institutions at lower levels – for 
example by packing user committees with loyalists through appointment from 
above, or by seeking to coopt civil society organisations – can open processes 
up to election from below.   
 
     But most of the more promising steps to be taken have little explicit 
connection to postures towards opposition parties.  Elite competition for the 
support of disadvantaged groups at the grassroots tends strongly to increase 
when many of the reforms discussed in this chapter are introduced.   
 
     There are two strands to this, and reforming governments need to be aware 
of both.  First, when ruling parties introduce pro-poor policies, it quickly 
becomes apparent to opposition parties that the poor may swing behind ruling 
parties at subsequent elections.  They therefore feel compelled to respond with 
pro-poor proposals of their own.  The ensuing bidding wars can yield major   50
benefits to the poor.  Second, when initiatives create opportunities at the local 
level for ordinary people to exercise influence, local leaders and elites often 
seek to seize them.  But when elections or mass meetings within localities 
determine who holds key posts or what decisions get taken, local leaders and 
elites often feel driven to cultivate support form disadvantaged groups – 
because they possess numerical strength.  And over time, poorer people acquire 
the confidence, skills and organisational strength to operate more effectively in 
their dealings with local leaders and elites – and even to throw up alternative 
leaders of their own.               
 
     Open, participatory politics at the local level thus offer poor and excluded 
groups considerable promise.  They also offer governments that reach out to 
these groups significant opportunities to cultivate their support.  Those 
governments need to bear this in mind when – inevitably – some of the 
implications of more open politics cause them dismay.   
 
     More open politics imply increasingly vibrant political contestation at the 
grassroots.  Reforming governments need to be willing to live with that – since 
hierarchies and inequalities are unlikely to be challenged in the absence of such 
contestation.  But they often find this difficult – where, for example, they are 
acutely anxious about maintaining public order, or where social tensions run 
high.   
 
     They also find it hard to tolerate the untidiness and unpredictability that 
come with more open politics.  These things stand in sharp contrast to the 
orderly and more predictable processes which technocrats foresee when they 
craft elegant blueprints for development programs.  When ordinary people or 
their representatives – whom technocrats often regard as unsophisticated and 
irrational -- are given decision-making powers, they often introduce priorities 
that differ from technocrats’ intentions.  Local councils may devise long-term 
plans that resonate with technocrats’ grand policies -- but then, after a time, 
wish to change them when new issues unexpectedly become urgent.  This sort 
of thing should be welcome to higher-ups in governments, but they may be 
tempted to react against such untidiness.  They need to steel themselves to 
tolerate these things because more open, participatory politics offer major 
benefits – to disadvantaged groups, to the pursuit of the Millennium 
Development Goals, and (not incidentally) to ruling parties. 
 
Pro-Poor Coalition Building and Elite Perceptions 
 
     Since the support of broad coalitions involving non-poor groups is almost 
always essential to the success of pro-poor initiatives, governments need to pay 
attention to perceptions of poverty among elites and other non-poor groups,
33 
                                                             
33  A recent research project on elite perceptions of poverty and poor people involved researchers from 
Brazil, Bangladesh, the Netherlands, the Philippines, India, Norway and Britain.  Its initial findings are 
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and to try to change them when they impede pro-poor coalition building and 
initiatives.   
 
     Some of those perceptions lend themselves to these things.  For example, in 
many developing countries it is widely agreed that in this information age, 
future prosperity depends on a strong education system.  Governments can 
stress this while mounting efforts to deliver basic education to all citizens – a 
policy from which the poor will gain disproportionately.   
 
     Other perceptions are less helpful.  Elites often underestimate the breadth 
and depth of poverty in their countries – the classic example is a failure to 
recognise rural poverty as a serious problem, but there are others.  
Governments can tackle this by publicising evidence on the seriousness and the 
extent of poverty.  Elites sometimes believe (wrongly) that poverty does not 
threaten them.  Governments can again provide information to show that (for 
example) certain communicable diseases like tuberculosis – which are bred by 
poverty – pose real threats to all social groups.  And since elites often refuse to 
support pro-poor policies because they doubt governments’ capacity to perform 
key tasks, improvements in governments’ overall performance can make elite 
perceptions more amenable.    
 
Measuring the Impact of Political Reforms 
 
     Those who invest their funds and their hopes in political reforms often ask, 
quite legitimately, whether their impact on ordinary people, especially the poor, 
can be measured.  Most of the studies that might help us to respond to this 
question suffer from serious shortcomings.   
 
     Macro-level measurements of change within entire countries have long been 
made by institutions such as Freedom House and Transparency International, 
but they do not consult ordinary people (never mind the poor) and their 
findings are too general and undisaggregated to help us much.  Other exercises 
have tended to be rather economistic – focusing on budgetting processes, 
financial flows, procurement and (non-social) auditing procedures, 
governments’ pay and employment practices, the implementation of civil 
service laws, etc.  These are interesting, but again, they tell us little or nothing 
about the impact of policies on ordinary folk and are often based on 
consultations with government employees rather than those whom they 
govern.
34    
 
     Our concern here is with the impact of political reforms at the local level, 
and that is harder to measure – both within and especially across countries.  It 
                                                             
34   For examples, see appendices 2, 5 and 6 of S. Knack, M. Kugler and N.Manning, Second 
Generation Indicators --a report funded by the UK’s DFID for a World Bank initiative on quantitative 
indicators of governance – (London, 2001).  A slightly more useful study is summarised in appendix 4 
of that document, dealing with governance in the Balkans, but it reveals only a few fragments of 
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also requires different methods which get at the perceptions of ordinary people 
in a locality and, more specifically, of poorer and socially excluded groups.   
 
     Very few studies have gone down this road.  Witness, for example, a recent 
analysis of 60 evaluations of development projects in the ‘governance’ field.    
Of these, only one-half paid any attention to the local level.  Only 8 consulted 
local residents – 3 through public opinion surveys, 4 through focus groups, and 
only one through questionnaires that targetted potential beneficiaries.
35    
 
     It is also important that we recognise the serious problems that attend the 
use of logical framework approach, which is very popular among international 
development agencies, in assessing the impact of political reforms.  This is not 
the place to examine these problems in detail.  But it is worth noting that this 
approach makes it very difficult or even impossible to attribute causality, and it 
often places an excessive emphasis on quantitative data when (as we shall see 
below) some crucial changes can only be understood by way of qualitative 
analysis.  The log frame approach also offers us little or nothing that can help 
to understand the political contexts and dynamics within which local actors 
operate.  And by assuming that progress will occur, it tends to not pay attention 
to the possibility that reforms may generate some negative results.
36 
 
     A few studies – by scholars and civil society organisations -- have provided 
more reliable analyses of the views of local residents on the impact of political 
reforms.
37   The most dependable of these have used survey methods to consult 
representative samples of residents in a locality -- plus poorer, socially 
excluded people there.  Since political reforms have usually been undertaken 
fairly recently, it is usually possible to ask respondents very simple, clear and 
above all specific questions about how government institutions functioned 
before and after a reform came into being. (Vague questions which only elicit a 
“general feeling” about the impact of reforms are of little use.
38)  Questions 
also need to be neutral, so that respondents can provide insights into damaging 
outcomes.  It is usually possible to discern patterns in responses that indicate 
whether and how much specific changes for the better have occurred.  (Such 
surveys have sometimes been – and ought to be -- supplemented with semi-
structured interviews with local residents who are especially well informed 
                                                             
35   G. Crawford with I. Kearton, Evaluating Democracy and Governance Assistance (Centre for 
Development Studies, University of Leeds, 2002) pp. 65 and 67. 
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1, Synthesis Report (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 2000) p, 66; and M. Schacter, 
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(Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, n.d.) and the summary of the Centre’s work on the internet at 
www.pacindia.org; the approach of CIET, an international group of social scientists and 
epidemiologists, which is partially revealed under ‘the evidence base’ on the ‘Pakistan’ page of its 
website, www.ciet.org; and Crook and Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation… 
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about the political context, local power dynamics and the political and policy 
processes – lawyers, journalists, school teachers, civil society association 
leaders, etc.)   
 
     Surveys are, however, expensive – so investigators sometimes use carefully 
chosen focus groups and/or participatory appraisal approaches that can also be 
revealing – although they are seldom as reliable as sizable surveys.  It is 
important, when these two approaches are used, to conduct separate exercises 
with (i) a representative sample of local residents, and (ii) poor, socially 
exluded residents -- because when the latter are included in a representative 
group, they tend to be intimidated and to remain rather quiet.  Discussions with 
focus groups prior to surveys can help investigators to decide what questions to 
raise during survey exercises.   
 
     Here are just a few examples of important questions about the outcomes of 
political reforms -- to which surveys (and those other methods) can yield 
reliable answers.  (Some of the questions in this list can be broken down into 
multiple questions.) 
 
     The first set of questions can be usefully put to all local residents. 
 
  Has the number of government development projects increased or 
decreased since the reform occurred? (When local institutions or groups 
are empowered to decide how to use development funds, they often 
choose many small projects which local residents prefer rather than a 
few large projects which higher authorities prefer.  This helps measure 
‘responsiveness’ by getting at the quantity of responses.) 
  Have government projects and actions conformed more, or less, to your 
preferences than before?  (This helps measure ‘responsiveness’ by 
getting at the quality of responses -- with ‘quality’ being assessed in 
terms of the extent to which responses conform to local preferences.) 
  Has absenteeism among the government’s local health and education 
professionals increased, declined or remained the same?  (Absenteeism 
is a severe problem in many countries.) 
  Have you become better or less well informed about the amount of 
development funds that are supposed to be spent in your locality? 
 
     The following set of questions is especially important among poor, socially 
excluded respondents.  It is important to put the crucial second question in the 
list above to such respondents.   
 
  Have you become better or less well informed about the wages paid to 
labourers on public works projects, and about the full lists of people 
who were supposedly employed? 
  Have you become better or less well informed about the official lists of 
beneficiaries from development projects?   54
  Have you become better or less well informed about the number and 
content of government projects/programmes that are supposed to reach 
your locality? 
  Have you benefited less or more than before from government 
projects/programmes (especially from things like water and sanitation 
projects, electrification, etc., which sometimes only reach areas of a 
locality inhabited by the non-poor)? 
  Have political leaders in and near the locality reached out to you less 
often or more often, and with less or more to offer you? 
  Are they competing for your support less or more than before? 
  Have you been able to influence decisions about local affairs less or 
more than before?  
  Have you or people like you contacted politicians and government 
officials less often or more often than before? 
  When contacted, have they been less or more helpful than before? 
  Do you participate in collective activities with people like you less often 
or more often than before? 
  Have organisations in which you participate come into being since the 
reform was introduced?  Have existing organisations become weaker or 
stronger, and less or more active since the reform was introduced? 
  Have civil society organisations outside your locality established or 
broken off ties to organisations in which you participate?        
 
When responses indicate important changes, investigators can follow up with 
subsidiary questions to elicit specific details.
39  
 
      The questions above enable us to quantify and measure many important 
aspects of the impact of political reforms.  However, three words of caution are 
in order here.  First, we need to recognise that some important potential 
impacts are exceedingly difficult – and in some cases impossible -- to measure.  
For example, we can use the second list of questions just above to get at and 
measure changes in poor people’s awareness, levels of participation, contacts 
with power holders, influence, and organisational strength.  But we cannot 
measure changes in their self-confidence and political skills – both of which are 
crucial.  We can gain insight into those things through qualitative studies – 
mainly through semi-structured interviews -- but they defy attempts at 
quantification.  We need to resist the temptation to dismiss such things for this 
reason – they are too important. 
 
     Second, some important changes in the policy process cannot be reliably 
assessed by putting questions to ordinary or to poor, excluded people.  If for 
example we want to know whether the uptake on ante- and post-natal care for 
                                                             
39   For other useful examples of questions for surveys, see any of the ‘report cards’ published on 
service delivery in Indian municipalities by the Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore, India.  For 
example, see Annexure 3 in S.Paul and A.Iyer, A Report Card on Public Services in Calcutta, Working 
Paper 118 (Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, 1997).     55
mothers and children has increased, or whether early warnings of potential 
disasters like floods or outbreaks of disease reach government employees, it is 
better to ask those employees and ‘well informed people’ noted above.  The 
same is true if we want to know whether competitive bidding for contracts to 
undertake building projects is more common, and so it goes on.   
 
     Finally, people’s responses to questions in one particular area – the impact 
of more open government on corruption -- may be unreliable.  If a political 
reform increases the transparency of the flow of government funds, corrupt 
acts become more visible.  As that happens, people may conclude that 
corruption has increased even when greater transparency causes the overall 
amount of money stolen to decline -- because those inclined to such acts fear 
discovery and thus engage in no corrupt acts or seek to steal only small 
amounts.  So to understand the impact of political reform on corruption, we 




     This chapter has focused not on state failure – the preoccupation of much 
recent analysis – but on state potential, and the promise of political reforms.  It 
is clear from events on the ground in many developing countries that reforms 
can make government more open, accountable and responsive – even in 
countries like Mozambique, Bangladesh and Indonesia where state capacity is 
limited and conditions are difficult.  Reforms can improve the quality of life of 
ordinary people and of disadvantaged groups among them.  More importantly, 
reforms can enhance their capacity to improve their own lives. 
 
     Consider just a few examples.  Political reforms can help to ensure that the 
things which governments deliver conform to popular preferences, by giving 
local residents some influence over the political and policy processes.  That in 
turn can persuade ordinary folk to become more active in injecting their views 
and their knowledge of local conditions into those processes, and in 
maintaining public facilities.  This yields better and more sustainable 
developmental outcomes.  Reforms can help to reduce absenteeism by 
government employees in crucial sectors such as health and education, and to 
reduce the overall amount of corruption.  They can increase the uptake on 
critically important government services.  When reforms inspire disadvantaged 
groups to engage in public affairs, their confidence, skills, connections, 
organisational strength – and thus their capacity to influence their own 
destinies – grow. 
 
     All of these things yield political benefits for governments that undertake 
reforms.  Information flows between governments and people at the local level 
increase in both directions.  The constructive potential of governments 
increases when the energies of civil society organisations and ordinary people 
are drawn into the development process.  And (not incidentally in the eyes of   56
political leaders) reforms also enhance governments’ legitimacy and popularity 
– no mean achievement in this era of fiscal constraints.   
 
     Indeed, the political reforms discussed here can help senior political leaders 
to fulfil most of their fondest wishes.  If we ask what these are, the answers 
usually go something like this. 
 
  I want to govern authoritatively. 
  I want to remain in power for as long as possible (which these days 
usually means ‘I want to be re-elected’). 
  I want to maximise my influence and overcome resistance at all 
levels -- all the way down through the political system and society to 
the grassroots. 
  I need political allies at all levels within government, and a social 
base among groups with formidable numerical strength. 
  I want to avoid being personally threatened – now and in the future. 
  I want to deliver something meaningful to people, despite 
excruciating fiscal constraints. 
  I want to be respected now and remembered later for adventurous 
accomplishments.  
 
Political reforms resonate with all of these aspirations. 
 
     An earlier generation of development specialists recognised the need to 
pursue not just economic growth, but also redistribution.  They reached this 
conclusion both because it was the just thing to do and because, without 
redistribution, the inequalities that often came with growth bred threats to 
growth itself.  The arguments here for democratisation with inclusion are 
similar.  Without inclusion, the political inequities that characterise many 
democratised systems can imperil democratisation.  And once again, it is the 
just thing to do.  
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